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REFORM FOR A SYSTEM IN CRISIS:
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
by
IR VING R. KA UFMAN*
INTRODUCTION

N its third century, the federal court system has entered a period of
crisis. Faced with ever-burgeoning caseloads and essentially static resources, the nation's courts fall further and further behind the promise of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: "the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action."' Long before Charles Dickens's scathing
attacks on the legal system,2 the delay and cost of adjudication was a
familiar target. 3 For the last four decades, reform groups have searched
for ways to reduce court congestion 4 and we have been warned for at
least ten years that relieving our overburdened court system is
imperative.5
Yet there is a new urgency abroad in the legal community, a recently
emerging sense that the stability and legitimacy of the system are genuinely at risk. Many observers see the courts on the verge of buckling
under the strain; one view from the trenches sees the problem of delay as
"'beyond the crisis stage.' "6 The problem is not merely one of harried
judges. Litigants, people with grievances, are being denied meaningful
access to the courts. 7 Delay prevents the courts from doing their job-* Judge and former Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit. Judge Kaufman is an alumnus of Fordham University and Fordham University
School of Law.
The author wishes to thank his former law clerk John Hillebrecht for his assistance in
cite-checking and suggestions.
1. Fed. R. Civ. P. 1.

2. See C. Dickens, David Copperfield (1957) (originally published in novel form in
1850); C. Dickens, Bleak House (1977) (originally published in novel form in 1853).

3. For an historical account, see H. Zeisel, H. Kalven & B. Buchholz, Delay in the
Court xxiii - xxiv n.6 (2d ed. 1959).
4. See Priest, Private Litigants and the Court Congestion Problem, 69 B.U.L. Rev.
527, 527 (1989).
5. See National Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, The Pound Conference: Perspectives on Justice in the Future Il
(1979) [hereinafter Pound Conference].
6. Labaton, New Tactics in the War on Drugs Tilt Scales ofJustice Off Balance, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 29, 1989, at Al, col. 1 (quoting Chief Judge Thomas C. Platt of the Eastern

District of New York).
7. See Nejelski, Supplements to Triak 4 Court 4dministrator'sView, 29 Viii. L. Rev.
1339, 1344 (1984) (discussing empirical studies demonstrating, in part, that "[m]any potential cases are kept from court because of cost and delay" of adjudication). L. Ralph

Mecham, Director of the Administrative Office of U.S. Courts, has speculated that potential plaintiffs have become so discouraged by the backlog that they are abandoning the
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resolving people's disputes at reasonable costs so that they may return to
their normal lives.
After more than forty years on the federal bench, I am convinced that
a decisive moment is at hand for the federal courts. The problem has
grown beyond the reach of tinkering with the periphery of the judicial
system. Flexibility, experimentation and a willingness to innovate are
essential if the administration of justice is to keep up with the society we
serve.8 What follows is a brief examination of proposed changes in judicial administration, stressing those that hold the greatest promise to reduce the major costs of justice-expense and delay.
I.

SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM AND SOME CAUSES

The Brookings Institution Task Force on Civil Justice Reform displayed great economy of expression in its 1989 report:9 "Civil litigation
costs too much and takes too long."' The expense of seeking judicial
determination affects the litigants themselves most directly. Persons who
seek redress in the courts, or who must defend themselves against legal
action, often face staggering legal fees." The cost to our national economy is more insidious: every dollar American business spends on litigation and every hour United States executives spend in depositions are
money and time diverted from developing or producing better products
at lower prices. 2
As daunting as the cost of litigation may be, the monster of delay
might be more imposing to litigants. In even our smaller urban jurisdictions, a delay of over two and a half years from filing of suit to trial has
become routine. 3 The median time from issue to civil trial in federal
federal courts. See Berke, Surging Criminal Cases Jam Federal Court System, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 26, 1989, at A24, col. 3.
8. An example of such an effort is the unprecedented step taken by ten federal district judges who moved to consolidate thousands of asbestos cases clogging their dockets.
See N.Y. Times, Aug. 11, 1990, at Al, col. 5. Presumably, a single judgment awarded to
similarly situated plaintiffs would lower transaction costs, allow for uniform damages and
resolve many analogous cases in a timely manner. The judges' actions, however, have
been subject to legal challenge from both plaintiffs' attorneys and defendant companies,
and have suffered at least one adverse ruling by an appellate court. See Nat'l L.J., Sept. 3,
1990, at 3, col. 1.
9. Brookings Task Force on Civil Justice Reform, Justice For All: Reducing Costs
and Delay in Civil Litigation (1989) [hereinafter Justice For All].
10. Id. at 1.
11. See, e.g., Rosenberg, Rient & Rowe, Jr., Expenses: The Roadblock to Justice, 20
Judges' J. 16, 17 (1981) (because of the cost of litigation, "the bright promise held up by
the American justice system is frequently a chimera"). But see Trubek, Sarat, Felstiner,
Kritzer, & Grossman, The Costs of OrdinaryLitigation 31 UCLA L. Rev. 72, 123 (1983)
(questioning whether most ordinary litigation is excessively costly to litigants and
society).
12. Cf Wermiel, Courting Disaster: The Costs of Lawsuits Growing Ever Larger Disrupt the Economy, Wall St. J., May 16, 1986, at 1, col. 6 (cost of litigation has become
part of cost of production and is being passed on to consumers).
13. See Alschuler, Mediation With a Mugger: The Shortage of Adjudicative Services
and the Need for a Two-Tier Trial System in Civil Cases, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1808, 1822
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district court is a year and a half, though the more difficult cases usually
take far longer. 4 Since 1986, the number of civil cases that have been on
federal dockets for more than three years has grown by a third, to
22,391.15
This growth in backlog and delay is in part attributable to the absolute
growth in federal caseloads-an increase of which I am painfully aware.
In 1949, the year in which I was appointed to the Southern District of
New York, 53,421 cases were brought in the district courts. 6 By 1989,
that number had grown to 233,293' 7-an increase of over 430 percent.
In 1961, the year President Kennedy elevated me to the Second Circuit,
4,204 cases were filed in the United States Courts of Appeals.' 8 This past
year, 39,734 appeals were taken.' 9
Of course, forty years has made for a faster, more complex and harder
world in many respects, and the public might agree with David Copperfield that the courts might be improved if we judges "got up early in
the morning, and took off our coats to the work."2 0 I am second to none
in my admiration of hard work, but that particular ointment has already
been liberally applied. In 1989, on average, federal district court judges
were responsible for 485 filed cases, 407 of which were civil filings."' In
human terms, this is a crushing burden that translates into a need to
dispose of more than a case a day or face an ever-growing backlog.
When I began as a district judge, the workload was a third of its present
prodigality.2"
(1986); see also T. Church, Jr., A. Carlson, J.Lee, & T. Tan, Justice Delayed: The Pace
of Litigation in Urban Trial Courts (1978) (describing findings of a national research
project on inefficiency in the courts).
14. See Director, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Twelve Month Period Ended June
30, 1989 - Appendix 1, Detailed Statistical Tables 36 (1989) [hereinafter 1989 Director's
Report - Appendix 1]. The 18-month figure is a more than threefold increase over 1949's
median disposition time. See Director, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Annual
Report ofthe Director of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts 111 (1949) [hereinafter 1949 Director's Report]. Ten percent of the 194,759 cases terminated during that year
had been pending more than 28 months. See 1989 Director's Report - Appendix 136. In
1989, the backlog of cases at least three years old pending before the Second Circuit grew
by 34.7% to 4,255. See Labaton, Federal Cases Mount in New York Circuit as Drug
Trials Dominate Docket, N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1990, at A36, col. I.
15. See 1989 Director'sReport - Appendix 1, supra note 14, at 40; see also Labaton,
supra note 6, at Al, col. 1 (combination of Speedy Trial Act and increase in drug-related
indictments causing unprecedented delays for civil litigants).
16. See 1949 Director'sReport, supra note 14, at 44.
17. See 1989 Director'sReport - Appendix 1, supra note 14, at 22. This number represents a decline of over 6,000 cases from the previous year's filings.
18. See Director, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the US. Courts for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30
1961 115 (1962).
19. See 1989 Director'sReport - Appendix 1, supra note 14, at 3.
20. C. Dickens, David Copperfield 479 (1957).
21. See 1989 Director'sReport - Appendix 1, supra note 14, at 134.
22. See 1949 Director'sReport, supra note 14, at I 11. Of course, numbers provide
only the sketchiest outline of a judge's labors. I am not alone in this view. Chief Judge

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59

What accounts for this avalanche of cases and the resulting delay?
The causes are almost as varied and distinct as each litigant, but some
general explanations can be set forth and one specific culprit identified
for the growing sense of crisis.
The general causes are rooted in changes in our society over the past
forty years. These decades have continued the expansion of a complex
industrial society with equally complex social patterns. Along with its
blessings, corporate America's markets and advanced industries have
created new, more widely dispersed risks: toxic chemicals, carcinogens
of dizzying variety and nuclear power plants, to name only a few. Society has responded with a broadened concept of rights and accompanying
remedies.23 These have spawned wholly new areas of law-vastly expanded consumer protection and products liability, and the creation
seemingly from whole cloth of "environmental law." To give substance
to the civil rights that lie at the core of America's promise to itself, the
judiciary and the Congress have revitalized the Civil War amendments
and related statutes, opening the courts to those alleging racial or ethnic
discrimination.2 4 Similarly, we have seen the growth in the "institutional
law suit," that great absorber of judicial resources that has judges temporarily running prisons, hospitals and schools. Public interest remedies,
class actions and statutory fee-shifting provisions have also become common, making it possible to bring suits that could not previously have
been brought.
Much of the delay on the civil side of the docket is attributable to the
vast expansion of federal criminal cases. Under the Speedy Trial Act,25
criminal defendants must be given a trial within ten weeks of indictment.
Accordingly, this requires trial judges to put criminal prosecutions at the
head of their calendars. The constitutionalization of many areas of criminal law and procedure makes the task of trial and appellate judges more
demanding.2 6 The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
James L. Oakes of the Second Circuit, criticizing legislative efforts to monitor the pace of
work of federal judges, declared that equating raw statistics with the true output of judicial work "reflects a lack of understanding of what we do." N.Y.L.J., Sept. 7, 1990, at 1,
col. 3.
23. See Kaufman, The Philosophy of Effective JudicialSupervision Over Litigation, 29
F.R.D. 207, 210 (1961).
24. See, e.g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) (in action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
state officers deemed to act under color of state law even if they violated a state statute);
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding unconstitutional racial segregation in public schools); Taylor v. Board of Educ., 191 F. Supp. 181 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 294
F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1961) (school board's failure to implement desegregation was a denial of
equal protection); Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a)-e-17 (Title VII) (1988).
Since 1970, federal employment discrimination case filings have increased over 2,000%.
See Coyle, Proposals on Courts Debated, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 12, 1990, at 1, col. 1.
25. 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (1988).
26. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (custodial interrogation triggers fifth amendment right against self-incrimination); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963) (uncounseled conviction violates the sixth and fourteenth amendments);
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("RICO")27 and Continuing Criminal Enterprise ("CCE")2 s cases-typically involving sprawling conspiracies with numerous defendants-are
popular tools in the prosecutors' hands, but they are voracious consumers of the courts' time.2 9 The Sentencing Guidelines a0 have created a
wholly new and time-consuming task for the appeals courts, the review
of sentences-virtually unheard of before the Guidelines. a"
While all of these elements play a role in clogging courtrooms and
squeezing out civil litigants, the greatest pressure on our court systemthe culprit alluded to above-is the "war on drugs." Federal enforcement agencies have the lead role in the crackdown on drugs that began
with the administration of President Ronald Reagan. From 1981
through 1989, the number of drug cases fied in federal district courts
leaped 270%.32 These cases are clogging the appellate courts as well. 3
In some districts, this eruption of priority drug cases diverts judicial
personnel and resources away from civil cases.3 4 To a frightening degree,
the federal courts are "becoming drug courts."3 " As a result, "[c]ivil
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment is inadmissible).
27. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1988).

28. 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1988).

29. See Chambers, The Frailtiesof Megatrialsare Numerous, Nat'l L.J., Oct. 3, 1988,
at 13.
The extraordinary 21-defendant "Pizza Connection" trial, a CCE/drug distribution
case heard in the Southern District of New York, "spanned more than seventeen months,
produced more than forty-thousand pages of trial transcript, and... involved the introduction of thousands of exhibits and the testimony of more than 275 witnesses." United
States v. Casamento, 887 F.2d 1141, 1149 (2d Cir. 1989), cerL denied, 110 S. Ct. 1138
(1990). This Brobdingnagian marathon was heard before a jury; the appellate panel's
opinion ran almost 50 pages.
30. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-81 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-98 (1988) [Sentencing Reform Act].
For my earlier plea that Congress pay more attention to legislation's impact on the judicial system, see Kaufman, JudicialReform in the Next Century, 29 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 5-6
(1976).
31. A recent survey reveals that 90% of district judges believe the Guidelines have
made sentencing more time-consuming, increasing the time required by 25 to 50%. See
Coyle, supra note 24, at 27, col 4.
32. See Berke, supra note 7, at A24, col. 3 (citing figures from Administrative Office
of the U.S. Courts). The mandatory sentences imposed in drug cases encourage defendants to press for full trial. Although narcotics prosecutions comprise less than a quarter
of the criminal docket, they account for 44% of all criminal trials and half of all criminal
appeals. See Coyle, supra note 24, at 27, col. 1.
33. In 1989, 4,386 appeals from drug convictions were taken. Over 3,000 of these
were narcotics-related. See 1989 Director'sReport - Appendix 1, supra note 14, at 17. In
1981, only 1,577 drug appeals were taken. See Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts - Appendix 1 362 (1982). The Judicial Conference
reported to Congress that by 1991, drug filings will increase from 20 to 50% over 1988
levels. See Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee 36 (1990) [hereinafter 1990
Report].
34. There is, of course, a ripple effect. Judges from around the country have been
sent to particularly overburdened courts, such as the Southern District of Florida, to
assist, leaving their own crowded dockets behind. See Kaufman Addresses Palm Beach
Round Table, 15 Inst. Jud. Admin. Rep. 1 (1983).
35. Labaton, supra note 6, at Al, col. 1 (quoting Judge Edward R. Becker of the
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litigants are in effect discriminated against." 36
Even without the delays attributable to the drug crisis, civil litigation
is slow and costly. Many lawyers apparently view their ability to drive
up the opponents' costs as a powerful weapon.37 The American rule
making each party responsible for its own legal fees encourages strategic
misuse of discovery, as well as the filing of dilatory and burdensome motions and "nuisance suits." 3 8 Both state and federal judges, as well as
litigators of all types, are particularly critical of the discovery process,
rating it the most important cause of both delay and excessive cost in
civil litigation. 9 Discovery has become a blunt bludgeon to beat the opposition into submission.
Whatever the reason, the bottom line is clear: "[T]here can be little
doubt that the system is not working very well. Too many cases take too
much time to be resolved and impose too much cost upon litigants and
taxpayers alike."' 4 High transaction costs of delay and direct expense
are the enemies of justice; when these costs become high enough, people
who have been injured or had their rights violated may despair of vindication, choosing instead to "lump it."4 To the extent that delay and
expense produce settlements, they can do so unfairly: some plaintiffs are
"being coerced by the cost of justice into accepting far less than their
due, while some defendants are yielding to opportunistic litigants who
unabashedly wield the
expenses of litigation as weapons to extort unde42
served settlements.
In 1989, for the third time in the past four years, the number of civil
cases in the district courts diminished. It appears that many potential
plaintiffs, discouraged by court backlogs, have abandoned hope of judiThird Circuit). In some districts, judges spend 50 to 70% of their time trying drug cases.
See Coyle, supra note 24, at 27, col. 1.
36. Berke, supra note 7, at A24, col. 3 (quoting L. Ralph Mecham, Director, Administrative Office of U.S. Courts).
37. As many as 92% of attorneys in large cases admitted that applying "economic
pressure on another party" was a factor in discovery tactics. See Brazil, Civil Discovery:
Lawyers' Views of Its Effectiveness, Its Principal Problems and Abuses, 1980 Am. B.
Found. Res. J. 787, 857 (1980).
38. See Rosenberg & Shavell, A Model in Which Suits are Broughtfor Their Nuisance
Value, 5 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 3, 3 (1985). For a discussion of the "strategic infliction of
waste," see Alschuler, supra note 13, at 1830-31. Alschuler concludes that American
procedure invites abuse by giving each party the power to drive up the other's unrecoverable costs. See id. at 1830; see also Schwarzer, Mistakes Lawyers Make in Discovery, 15
Litigation 31, 31 (Winter 1989) ("For many lawyers, discovery is a Pavlovian reaction.").
39. See Louis Harris and Associates, Judges' Opinions on ProceduralIssues: A Survey
of State and Federal Trial Judges Who Spend At Least Half Their Time on General Civil
Cases, 69 B.U.L. Rev. 731, 733 (1989); Justice for All, supra note 9, at 6.
40. Newman, Rethinking Fairness: Perspectives on the Litigation Process, 94 Yale L.J.
1643, 1644 (1985).
41. See Alschuler, supra note 13, at 1813; Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. Rev. 4, 14 (1983).
42. Kaufman, supra note 30, at 2.
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cial disposition.4 3 When access to the courts becomes so impeded that
the people begin to abandon the system, both the courts and the public
are imperiled. If we are to give substance to the promise of "just, speedy,
and inexpensive" adjudication," decisive steps must be taken.
The Federal Courts Study Committee, which Congress created to examine the challenges facing the federal judicial system, has concluded
that without emergency action, "the courts soon will be unable to discharge their core functions."4 5 The perception that things have come to
a critical pass is now widely shared. That common sense of urgency has
led to a welter of ambitious proposals over the last year. Reformers are
looking beyond the well-worn paths of adding judges and imposing stiffer
sanctions to more innovative possibilities.4 6 The challenges of delay and
'
expense demand more than "tinkering changes." 47
The Brookings Task Force proposed that each district court adopt
"differentiated case management" so that cases of varying complexity are
placed on different time tracks for discovery and trial.4" Each non-complex case would be assigned a firm trial date, with associated discovery
cut-off dates and time limits for the disposition of motions.49 The Task
43. See Berke, supra note 7, at 24, col. 3 (statement of L. Ralph Mecham, Director,
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts). "Where we fail to fulfill the needs of the times
our jurisdiction is sidetracked... and, in the long run, the strength of the law and of our
society is weakened." Kaufman, supra note 23, at 216.
44. Fed. R. Civ. P. 1.
45. Coyle, supra note 24, at 1, col. I (quoting Committee conclusion).
46. See Labaton, supra note 6, at Al, col 1. Adding judges has historically been the
remedy for expanding demands on the federal courts, and some still advocate this
straightforward response. See id For my argument rejecting this as an unwise and inefficient response, see Kaufman, New Remedies For the Next Century of Judicial Reform:
Time As the GreatestInnovator, 57 Fordham L. Rev. 253, 256-61 (1988). This should not
be taken as an endorsement of the political branches' sloth in filling already authorized
judgeships. Five percent of judges' chairs are constantly vacant, on average for 10
months but frequently far longer. See Federal Bar Council, Judicial Vacancies-The
Processingof Judicial Candidate. Why It Takes So Long and How It Could be Shortened, 128 F.R.D. 143, 143 (1989).
A more promising response lies in sanctioning dilatory litigation practices. In 1983,
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 was amended to "reduce the reluctance of courts to
impose sanctions." Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's notes. Proposals to further
toughen the provision, or to augment Rule 68, have frequently been made. See generally
Simon, The Riddle of Rule 68, 54 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1 (1985) (discussing various proposals to amend Rule 68).
47. The term is Mr. Justice Powell's. See Amendments to the Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure, 85 F.R.D. 521, 523 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting).
48. See Justice for All, supra note 9, at 14-17. The aim is to give simple cases the
quick scheduling they deserve by avoiding "Cadillac-style procedures" in "bicycle-size
lawsuits." Id. at 14-15 (quoting Rosenberg, The Federal Civil Rules after Haifa Century,
36 Me. L. Rev. 242, 247 (1984)).
49. See Justice for All, supra note 9, at 17-22. Only narrow exceptions for "good
cause" would be permitted. The General Accounting Office has concluded that the enforcement of such time standards is the key to effective case management. Id. at 17
(citing Comptroller Gen., U.S. General Accounting Office, Better Management Can Ease
Federal Civil Case Backlog (1981)).
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Force also embraced the concept of "staged discovery." 5 During the
first phase, minimal discovery is conducted to develop a realistic assessment of the case in order to facilitate prompt resolution. Full-blown discovery will be permitted only if efforts to settle or otherwise dispose of
the case fail. 5
While staged discovery may speed the disposition of cases, an approach that holds greater promise is, in Judge Henry Friendly's words,
"averting the flood by lessening the flow" 5 2-that is, diverting some cases
from trial in federal courts to other forms of fair and just determination.
The biggest diversion would be the abolition of diversity jurisdiction. 3
Diversity actions-everything from automobile accidents to contract disputes-account for more than a quarter of federal cases. 54 To date, Congress has resisted abolishing diversity jurisdiction.55 Although support is
growing for such a major restructuring of the judicial landscape, 56 stiff
opposition from the organized bar and from state judges remains.5 7 De50. Id. at 20-21.
51. See Peckham, A JudicialResponse to the Cost of Litigation: Case Management,
Two-Stage Discovery Planning and Alternative Dispute Resolution, 37 Rutgers L. Rev.
253, 268 (1985); Lambros, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: A New Adversarial
Model Fora New Era, 50 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 789, 804-06 (1989). The Task Force's proposal
would, of course, increase the judge's "managerial" involvement in pre-trial proceedings,
a controversial role discussed more fully below.
52. Friendly, Averting the Flood by Lessening the Flow, 59 Cornell L. Rev. 634 (1974).
53. See id. at 640-41; Kaufman, supra note 46, at 267-68; Feinberg, Is Diversity Jurisdiction An Idea Whose Time Has Passed?, N.Y. St. B.J. (July 1989). As Friendly and
others have suggested, we might also shift certain cases to administrative tribunals or new
Article I courts. Proponents of the use of administrative courts to process misdemeanor
crimes point to the use of this method in Britain. See Newsday, Feb. 20, 1990, at 3, col.
1.
54. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1990, at D2, col. 1. In the circuit courts, 16% of all civil
appeals, some 4,287 cases, were diversity cases. See 1989 Director'sReport - Appendix 1,
supra note 14, at 16. It has been estimated that diversity cases annually consume resources equivalent to 193 district judges and 22 courts of appeals judges. These cases go
to trial more often than non-diversity cases. See 1990 Report, supra note 33, at 41.
55. See H.R. 4314, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); H.R. 9622, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.,
reprintedin FederalDiversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction: HearingsBefore the Subcommittee on Improvements in JudicialMachinery of the Committee of the Judiciary,95th Cong.,
2d Sess. 10 (1978).
56. For example, the Federal Courts Study Committee has embraced the idea. See
1990 Report, supra note 33, at 38-40. The Committee was established by the Judicial
Improvements and Access to Justice Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4642,
4644 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
57. The ABA has fought aggressively to preserve diversity jurisdiction. See N.Y.
Times, Jan. 8, 1990, at D2, col. 1. State judges argue that its abolition would swamp their
systems. See, e.g., Wachtler, DiversityJurisdiction: Casefor Retention, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 17,
1990, at 39, col. 1 (arguing that abolition of diversity jurisdiction will only reroute cases
to overburdened state courts). The National Center for State Courts has calculated that
on average each state judge of general jurisdiction would see his or her docket grow by
only 11 cases. See Flango & Boresina, How Would Proposed Changes in Jurisdiction
Affect State Courts? (National Center For State Courts 1989). Such a rough calculation
does not convey a sense of the impact on individual states. New York, whose state court
system groans under backlog, hears 10% of all diversity cases. See Wachtler, supra, at
51.
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spite this resistance, the elimination of diversity jurisdiction seems the
correct approach to alleviate an overloaded docket.
II.

AVERTING THE FLOOD WITH

ADR

Short of learning to live together with greater comity, we must find a
way to settle disputes more efficiently." Reallocating judicial business by
the varied methods of "alternative dispute resolution," or ADR, holds
out great promise of accomplishing this goal. Because ADR has only
recently developed all the trappings of a "movement," including an acronym, specialized journals59 and think tanks,"3 we sometimes forget that
there has been a long history of alternatives to formal adjudication. Most
familiar are extrajudicial mechanisms such as voluntary, binding arbitration. Indeed, such arbitration has been practiced in North America since
colonial times6 and its scope and legitimacy are expanding. 2
The popularity of private resolution has grown along with the delay
and cost of court adjudication. Large corporations have increasingly
turned to such devices to settle complex business disputes, and are increasingly willing to experiment and entrust high-stakes cases to ADR.6 3
58. Whether American society is markedly more litigious than others is not the issue
here. I note only that the empirical evidence is far from persuasive. Data from one study
shows that only a small portion of disputes in the United States become lawsuits and that
the number of actions is not excessive for the changing conditions of society. See Galanter, supra note 41, at 36-37, 39. The core issue has been well stated by Derek Bok:
"The blunt, inexcusable fact is that this nation, which prides itself on efficiency and justice, has developed a legal system that is the most expensive in the world, yet cannot
manage to protect the rights of most of its citizens." N.Y. Times, Apr. 22, 1983, at B4,
col. 1. The challenge is to restore meaningful access to justice through the reduction of
cost and delay.
59. E.g., Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution; Alternative Dispute Resolution
Report (BNA); Alternatives to the High Cost of Litigation (Center for Public Resources).
60. E.g., The National Institute for Dispute Resolution; Stanford Center on Conflict
and Negotiation.
61. See generally F. Kellor, American Arbitration 4-8 (1948) (history of arbitration in
the United States).

62. See, e.g., Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 109 S. Ct.
1917, 1919-22 (1989) (predispute agreements to arbitrate claims under the Securities Act
of 1933 are enforceable) (overruling Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953)); Dean Witter
Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 217 (1985) (federal courts may not stay arbitration
pending resolution of non-arbitrable claims by court).
63. See, for example, the resolution through arbitration of a gargantuan dispute between International Business Machines and Fujitsu over Fujitsu's alleged misappropriation of IBM software. See Miller, IBM, Fujitsu End Dispute Over Software, Wall St. I.,
Sept. 16, 1987, at 2, col. 1. One of the two arbitrators, Stanford Law Professor Robert
Mnookin, described a flexible process:
We were able to choose different dispute settlement techniques for different
problems and issues. Broadly speaking, we acted as mediators in developing the
framework for the resolution, and as arbitrators in implementing that framework. In addition, we presided over meetings of responsible executives of both
parties using a mini-trial format. We also held independent fact-finding meetings with customers.
Beyond Litigation: An Interview With Robert H. Mnookin '68, Stanford Lawyer, Spring/
Summer 1989, at 43.
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Other methods of private adjudication-including mediation, judges-forhire and mini-trials-have also gained their advocates and critics. 6"
The focus of this article, however, is on what we generally describe as
judicial ADR mechanisms, those used in connection with court proceedings. The nascent trend toward including ADR mechanisms within the
judicial system might well develop into a major wave of judicial reform,
one capable of restoring meaningful access to the courts. 6 This assimilation has great potential, but it is not a panacea for all that ails the administration of justice. As we consider institutionalizing ADR within the
federal courts, we must take care to embrace only those mechanisms that
promise to reduce litigation's cost while increasing its pace. Above all,
we must ensure that the programs implemented meet our standards of
justice. The challenge for the federal courts is to reap the benefits of
ADR while minimizing the risks.
A.

ADR in the Courthouse: Some Examples
1. The Civil Appeals Management Plan

One of the first programs to institutionalize ADR processes in the federal courts was one I introduced in 1974, my first year as Chief Judge of
the Second Circuit. This innovation, the Civil Appeals Management
Plan ("CAMP"), injected court-sponsored mediation into appellate liti64. See generally Green, Growth of the Mini-Trial, 9 Litigation 12, 12 (1982) (minitrial approach to complex civil cases); Kolb & Rubin, Research Into Mediation: What
We Know Now, What's Left To Learn, Dispute Resolution Forum 3, 6 (Nat'l Institute for
Dispute Resolution 1989) (pros and cons of mediation); Maatman, The Future of Summary Jury Trials in Federal Courts: Strandell v. Jackson County, 21 J. Marshall L. Rev.
455, 456 n.4 (1988) (citing ABA estimate of 400 "rent-a-judge" companies in 1985);
Kaufman, Crowded Courtrooms: Jury's Still Out on Judges-for-Hire, Wall St. J., Nov. 9,
1988, at 22, col. 3 (rent-a-judge approach).
In essence, a mini-trial is a voluntary, confidential and non-binding procedure consisting of an informal, abbreviated presentation of each side's case before principals of the
parties who have authority to settle. A neutral moderator can preside and give his evaluation. See Green, The Mini-TrialApproach to Complex Litigation, in Alternative Dispute
Resolution: A Handbook for Judges 151-52 (P. Harter ed. 1987).
65. One commentator contends that the effect on the judicial landscape of court-annexed alternative dispute resolution will be comparable to the sea change introduced by
Arthur Vanderbilt after the Second World War: the establishment of "unified" state
court systems staffed by a professional judiciary. See Alfini, Alternative Dispute Resolution and the Courts: An Introduction, 69 Judicature 252, 252 n.7 (1986). The Chinese
wall between "private alternative dispute resolution" and "judicial alternative dispute
resolution" erected here oversimplifies to a degree. One commentator has noted that
"dispute resolution is 'all of a piece,' all part of one system in which proximity to or
distance from court is not the crucial defining factor." Bush, Defining Quality in Dispute
Resolution: Taxonomies and Anti-Taxonomies of Quality Arguments, 66 Den. U.L. Rev.
335, 342-43 (1989). But from the standpoint of judicial administration, closeness to the
court is all important.
Court-annexed alternative dispute resolution has been described as one of the "most
promising" approaches to simplifying access to justice. See McKay, Rule 16 and A Iternative Dispute Resolution, 63 Notre Dame L. Rev. 818, 822 (1988).

1990]

ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION

gation.6 6 The primary aims of CAMP are to encourage the resolution of
appeals short of full-blown appellate proceedings and to expedite the disposition of all civil appeals. Virtually all civil appeals taken in the Second Circuit are referred to CAMP." Within ten days of docketing an
appeal, the appellant must submit a brief "Pre-Argument Statement."
One of the circuit's two full-time "staff counsel" then issues a schedule
including a date for a CAMP conference, deadlines for the filing of briefs
and a date for oral argument of the appeal. Because parties are more
likely to settle before they have invested large sums in preparing for the
appeal, the first conference is scheduled well in advance of the deadline
for filing briefs.
At this first conference, counsel discuss in depth the strengths and
weaknesses of their cases. In addition, "[a]ttorneys should obtain advance authority from their clients to make such commitments as may
reasonably be anticipated." 6 8 At the conclusion of the conference, a staff
attorney is expected to give counsel "the benefit of his [or her] views of
the merits,"69 and does not hesitate to point out weaknesses or to predict
the outcome of the appeal. To promote honest discussion and to avoid
any hint of judicial pressure, all participants are prohibited from advising
the court of the detailed discussions at the conference. A party that
breaches confidentiality is subject to censure.
In the words of former Chief Judge Feinberg, CAMP's success "has
been outstanding." 7 0 In 1989, the program disposed of 601 appeals without briefs or arguments '-nearly twenty percent of the total appeals terminated. In more concrete terms, CAMP settles more cases than two
judges would normally handle in a year at one-third the cost of two judicial chambers. Early settlement saves large sums for parties by sparing
them the expense of briefs and oral argument.
In short, CAMP has achieved its goals.72 It "does result in the settlement or withdrawal of appeals that would otherwise have to be considered by three-judge panels." 73 It "almost certainly results in faster
66. I have described CAMP in greater detail elsewhere. See Kaufman, Must Every
Appeal Run the Gamut?-The Civil Appeals Management Plan, 95 Yale L.J. 755 (1986);
Kaufman, The Pre-Argument Conference: An Appellate ProceduralReform, 74 Colum. L.
Rev. 1094 (1974).
67. CAMP Rules, which have the effect of local rules, are reprinted at U.S. Ct. of
App. 2d Cir. Rule App., 28 U.S.C.A. (XVest 1990).
68. Guidelines for Conduct of Pre-Argument Conference, reprintedin Committee on
Federal Courts of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Appeals to the
Second Circuit 121 (6th ed. 1988).
69. Id.
70. Feinberg, Civil Appeals Management Plan, in Alternative Dispute Resolution: A
Handbook for Judges 78, 80 (P. Hater ed. 1987).
71. See Squiers, Rise in Settlements Under CAMP Program, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 14, 1989,
at 1, col. 3.
72. See id.
73. A. Patridge & A. Lind, A Reevaluation of the Civil Appeals Management Plan 5
(1983).
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disposition" of cases that settle and "probably results in faster disposition
of appeals that are argued." 74 By a substantial margin, attorneys enjoyed
participating in CAMP." Indeed, this pioneer effort at resolving appeals
quickly and cheaply has surpassed its objective.
2.

Early Neutral Evaluation

Some of the lessons of CAMP have been applied creatively to the district courts. Recognizing that the greatest potential savings to litigants
must be reaped in the formative stages of cases, some districts have begun
programs of early intervention to facilitate settlement. The Northern
District of California has adopted a program of "early neutral evaluation" ("ENE"), 76 a pre-trial case evaluation by an experienced neutral
attorney who assesses the case and discusses it with all parties and
counsel.
The central feature of ENE is an evaluation session somewhat similar
to the CAMP conference. The innovation of the Northern District was
to place top priority on holding the evaluation promptly. Similar programs in the past have called for intervention only after extensive discovery has been completed." The principal aim of ENE is to hold an
evaluation before major discovery.78 The session is presided over by a
neutral evaluator who has received a ten-page statement from each party.
Absent undue hardship, the parties must be present with their counsel.
74. Id. This study urged that other courts of appeals follow the lead of CAMP, see
id. at 11, and many have. See Kaufman, Must Every Appeal Run the Gamut?-The Civil
Appeals Management Plan, supra note 66, at 761-62.
75. See A. Patridge & A. Lind, supra note 73, at 61. Most lawyers practicing in the
Second Circuit like CAMP "primarily because they believe (correctly) that it fosters the
nonjudicial resolution of some appeals." Id. at 74.
76. The California program is one of the most well established. See General Order
No. 26, U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California (1985); Brazil, Kahn,
Newman & Gold, Early Neutral Evaluation: An ExperimentalEffort to Expedite Dispute
Resolution, 69 Judicature 279, 279-81 (1986); Levine, Northern District of California
Adopts Early Neutral Evaluation to Expedite Dispute Resolution, 72 Judicature 235, 23538 (1989). The D.C. court system has also been experimenting with ENE. See Kessler &
Finkelstein, The Evolution of a Multi-door Courthouse, 37 Cath. U.L. Rev. 577, 590
(1988). The authority to establish the ENE program by local rule flows from Fed. R.
Civ. P. 83 (authorizing the promulgation of local rules), Fed. R. Civ. P. 53 (concerning
special masters), and the courts' inherent power to appoint masters. See Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 312-13 (1920). Peterson and its progeny establish the courts' authority
to appoint a master over the objection of the parties and to require them to pay the
master's fee (a component of some ENE programs). See Brazil, Authority to Refer Discovery Tasks to Special Masters: Limitations on Existing Sources and the Need for a New
FederalRule, in W. Brazil, G. Hazard, Jr. & P. Rice, Managing Complex Litigation: A
Practical Guide to the Use of Special Masters 305, 366-67 (1983).
77. See Brazil, Kahn, Newman & Gold, supra note 76, at 280 n.3.
78. See Brazil, Special Masters in Complex Cases: Extending the Judiciaryor Reshaping Adjudication?, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 394, 407-08 (1986). The stated goal in the
Northern District of California was to hold its session within 100 days of filing of the
complaint. To date, this goal has proved elusive. Sessions were held within 173 days for
25% of the cases; 193 days for 50%; 240 days for 75%; and 429 for 100%. See Levine,
supra note 76, at 237.
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After each side presents a summary of its argument, the evaluator
frankly assesses the strengths and weaknesses of arguments and evidence,
and offers a non-binding evaluation of the case. 79
By forcing the parties to prepare for an early presentation, ENE encourages parties to do their basic homework sooner than they otherwise
would. This self-evaluation leads to a more realistic assessment of a
case's merit. In addition, the evaluator's figures can give parties or counsel a "reality check," deflating rosy expectations."0 The session also provides an opportunity for real communication between the parties, beyond
the fog of notice pleadings, and increases client involvement in the early
stages of the litigation."'
If the evaluator finds the parties willing to explore settlement after the
assessment is given, she may facilitate negotiations by mediating or
caucusing seriatim with the parties. If an early settlement does not materialize, the evaluator proposes a schedule of phased discovery under
which the parties first obtain that evidence on which the key aspects of
the case are most likely to turn. 2 The evaluators, however, lack the
power to enter binding orders.8 3
To date, ENE's performance has been impressive.' Parties and attorneys have felt that the program provided them with useful information
about their opponent's case, as well as their own. Most have agreed that
ENE enabled them to obtain key information more quickly and at less
expense while focusing the case on the central issues. In addition, parties
and counsel have felt that the process increased the chance of settlement. 5 While ENE has yet to be subjected to sufficient study to justify
firm conclusions about its cost-effectiveness,
most of those who have par86
ticipated in the program rate it a success.
3.

Summary Jury Trial

A different approach to facilitating early disposition is the summary
jury trial ("SJT"). 7 Developed by Judge Thomas D. Lambros of the
79. See Brazil, Kahn, Newman & Gold, supra note 76, at 280. The evaluators in the
Western District of Washington, for example, become involved after the bulk of discov-

ery has been completed. See Volunteer Attorney Mediation Program, Western and Eastern Districts of Washington, Alternatives to the High Cost of Litigation, Special Issue
1985, at 11-12 (Center for Public Resources 1985). The valuation is usually expressed in
a range of minimum and maximum.
80. See Brazil, Kahn, Newman & Gold, supra note 76, at 283.
81. See id.
82. See id, at 282.
83. As originally designed, the program's veil of confidentiality prevented the evaluator from reporting to the court his staged discovery plan. Some argue that this policy
should be changed. See id.
84. See Levine, supra note 76, at 237-38.
85. See id at 236.
86. Of those surveyed, 79.6% of attorneys and 73.8% of parties reported a high level
of satisfaction. See id at 236.
87. See Lambros, supra note 51, at 798; Lambros, The Summary Jury Trialand Other
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Northern District of Ohio in 1980, summary jury trials are used when
the "dynamics of the controversy" make settlement unlikely8 8 and an
extensive trial probable. The intent is to foster settlement by forecasting
civil jury verdicts, giving the parties a reliable preview of the outcome
"upon which to build a mutually acceptable settlement." 9
In essence, summary jury trial is an abbreviated presentation to an
advisory jury whose decision serves as a "crystal ball" the parties can use
to predict a real jury's verdict.9" The procedure is not binding unless the
parties stipulate otherwise. The process comes into play late in the pretrial period when an impasse in settlement negotiations has been reached
and a trial is the next step. Discovery should be complete, motions in
limine disposed of, and trial briefs and proposed jury instructions submitted. In sum, the case should be fully prepared for trial.
A summary jury trial may be conducted by a judge or by a magistrate
upon assignment from the court. A venire of sufficient size to provide a
jury of six is called from the regular jury pool.9 Limited voir dire by the
court follows; counsel are usually permitted a limited number of challenges. Jurors are instructed on the importance of rendering a true verdict and are further told that their decision will "aid and assist the parties
in resolving their dispute." 92
There are no live witnesses at summary jury trials, hence no direct or
cross-examination. Counsel simply summarize the anticipated evidence
Alternative Methods of Dispute Resolution: A Report to the Judicial Conference of the
United States Committee on the Operationof the Jury System, 103 F.R.D. 461, 468 (1984)
[hereinafter Report to the JudicialConference]; Lambros, The Summary Jury Trial-An
Alternative Method of Resolving Disputes, 69 Judicature 286 (1986) [hereinafter An Alternative Method]; see also Posner, The Summary Jury Trialand Other Methods of Alternative Dispute Resolution: Some Cautionary Observations, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 366, 368
(1986) (analyzing summary jury trial in light of four stringent criteria for procedural
reform). Summary jury trial is infrequently, though somewhat more accurately termed
"advisory trial."
88. See An Alternative Method, supra note 87, at 286. Judge Lambros has noted that
"[t]here is a certain class of cases in which the only bar to settlement among parties is the
difference in opinion of how a jury will perceive evidence adduced at trial." Appendix B:
Handbook and Rules of the Court for Summary Jury Trial Proceedings, in Report to the
Judicial Conference, supra note 87, at 482.
89. Lambros, The Judge's Role in Fostering Voluntary Settlements, 29 Vill. L. Rev.
1363, 1373 (1984).
90. See Marcus, Completing Equity's Conquest? Reflections on the Future of Trial
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 50 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 725, 749 (1989).
9 1. In a large district, it may be possible to coordinate the procedure with actual trials
that are getting under way. Those disqualified from regular jury service could be called
for summary jury service later in the day. See Report to the JudicialConference, supra
note 87, at 473-74.
92. Lambros, An Alternative Method, supra note 87, at 289. Jury instructions do not
further emphasize the non-binding nature of the proceeding. The "Juror Profile Form"
completed by venire members describes summary jury trial as "a summarized presentation of a case upon which you will be expected to decide the issues within one day."
Report to the Judicial Conference, supra note 87, at 490 (Appendix C: Juror Profile
Form). The verdict forms are labeled "advisory." See id. at 492 (Appendix D: Jurors'
Advisory Opinion).
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in a combined opening statement and closing argument, presenting exhibits to the jury when necessary. 93 Frequently, exhibit notebooks are
distributed to the jury. The narrative approach permits counsel to
quickly sketch an overview of the dispute sufficient to "give the jury a
birdseye [sic] view of what the case is all about." 94 Typically, an hour is
allotted to each side; rebuttal time may be reserved by the plaintiff."
Following counsels' presentations, the jury is charged and then retires
to deliberate. While unanimous verdicts are encouraged, if the jurors
cannot agree, they may return a special verdict, anonymously listing individual determinations of liability and damages. Although not as definitive as a unanimous decision, these special verdicts assist in the
settlement process as well.96 The final phase of the trial proper is a postverdict debriefing of the jurors by court and counsel. From the jurors'
critique on the merits, the litigants learn more about the strengths and
weaknesses of their case.
Part of the appeal of the summary jury trial is its flexibility. The allotted time can be expanded, the live testimony of a key witness might be
given, video monologues might be played and, in big cases, two juries
might be used to give a range of possible determinations.9 7
Parties frequently reach a settlement immediately after the summary
hearing, though several weeks are usually needed to evaluate the verdict. 98 If agreement is not reached shortly after the advisory verdict, a
pretrial conference is held to discuss settlement. If no disposition is
reached, the case will be called for actual trial within thirty to sixty days
of the summary hearing. 99

In addition to its value as a predictive tool, summary jury trial plays
an important role as a "doomsday event." By imparting the same sort of
psychological urgency as a trial, the process does not permit self-deception. The approach of a summary jury trial intensifies efforts to settle
and, as in the familiar settlement "on the courthouse steps," the parties
frequently reach agreement just before or even during the summary hear93. "Representations of facts must be supportable by reference to discovery materials,
by a professional representation that counsel has spoken with the witness and is
repeating that which the witness stated." Report to the Judicial Conference, supra note
87, at 471. Excerpts of documents may be read. See id. Objections are discouraged and
it is hoped that motions in limine and the pre-trial conference will settle most evidentiary
disputes.
94. Remarks of Judge Lambros, Annual Judicial Conference, Second Judicial Circuit
of the United States, 115 F.R.D. 349, 368 (1986).
95. "Sandbagging" the defendant by holding back on an important aspect of the case
will lead to the defendant receiving response time. See Report to the Judicial Conference,
supra note 87, at 483-84 (Appendix B: Handbook and Rules of the Court for Summary
Jury Trial Proceedings) [hereinafter Appendix B].
96. "The special verdict has proved invaluable in affording counsel insights as to lay
perceptions of the case and in suggesting an equitable basis for settlement." Id. at 484.
97. See Maatman, supra note 64, at 464-67; An Alternative Method, supra note 87, at
289-90.
98. See An Alternative Method, supra note 87, at 290.
99. See Appendix B, supra note 95, at 484.
...or
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ing. ° Summary jury trial also provides one other valuable function, arguably making the eventual settlement more palatable to some parties.
Many who have participated in such trials report that the summary proceeding satisfied their psychological need for "a day in court"-something that cannot be said for the ordinary settlement. 10
Summary jury trials have been used in a wide spectrum of cases, from
straightforward contract disputes to complex antitrust and class action
tort suits. Judge Lambros has found that these trials foster more equitable settlements while easing the strain on his docket. 10 2 While countrywide statistics are unavailable, some estimate that 100 federal and state
judges have utilized the technique in over 1,000 disputes. 1 3
The intent of the summary jury trial is to preserve judicial resources
for "hardcore" disputes by facilitating disposition short of a full-blown
trial in those cases that have reached an impasse in negotiations. To
date, it appears to have met these goals. Of the 150 cases Judge Lambros
assigned to summary jury trials over a six-year period, only five went to a
regular jury trial." °4 This high settlement rate' 0 5 appears all the more
remarkable when we recall that only those cases in which settlement is

deemed unlikely are selected for summary jury trials. Other courts have

reported similarly encouraging empirical findings.'0 6 Moreover, a majority of participating attorneys believed that summary jury trial led to a
more rapid resolution of cases. 107
The financial saving to the parties is evident. Perhaps equally impor100. See An AlternativeMethod, supra note 87, at 286-87; see also Arabian Am. Oil Co.
v. Scarfone, 119 F.R.D. 448, 449 (M.D. Fla. 1988) ("The reality is that too many [lawyers] will not get ready until the day of a trial; a summary trial forces that day and that
preparation!"). In the Northern District of Ohio, roughly 44% of cases assigned for
summary jury trial settled before the hearing. See Report to the Judicial Conference,
supra note 87, at 472-73.
101. See Marcus, supra note 90, at 776-77. See generally E. Lind & T. Tyler, The
Social Psychology of Procedural Justice (1988) (reviewing current theory of procedural
justice and exploring its psychological implications for legal, political, interpersonal and
work-related settings).
102. See Appendix B, supra note 95, at 486.
103. See Lambros, supra note 51, at 802. Over 65 federal judges had used the process
as of 1988. See Maatman, supra note 64, at 457.
104. See Lambros, supra note 94, at 368.
105. Although one frequently hears that "90% of cases settle," this is merely a convenient shorthand. It signifies that upwards of 90% of federal civil cases are "terminated
short of trial." Second Circuit Committee on the PretrialPhase of Civil Litigation, Final
Report, 115 F.R.D. 453, 457 (1986). This includes the roughly 30% that are disposed of
by motion. In recent years, no more than 60% of all federal civil cases settled. See
Flanders, Blind Umpires-A Response to ProfessorResnik, 35 Hastings L.J. 505, 516 n.56
(1984).
106. For example, in 1980 the Western District of Oklahoma introduced summary
jury trials for selected cases poised for lengthy trials. Compared to similar cases at the
same stage of litigation, settlement rate increased from 84 to 96%. See B. Meierhoefer,
Court-Annexed Arbitration in the Western District of Oklahoma 1 (Federal Judicial
Center 1988).
107. Seventy-two percent of plaintiffs' attorneys believed it was "much more rapid,"
whereas 28% answered it was "somewhat more rapid." The figures for defense counsel
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tant is the preservation of the courts' most precious resource--time. 08
Because summary jury trials are targeted at complex disputes that would
necessitate lengthy trials, their effect on the docket may well be disproportionate to the number of cases in which they have been used."' 9 Ideally, the result is that other litigants face shorter queues while those who
participate in summary jury trials are afforded a speedy, just disposition
of their case.
4. Court-Annexed Arbitration
Court-annexed arbitration ("CAA") is an additional innovative procedure that holds real promise for conserving judicial time, accelerating
resolution of disputes and reducing costs to the parties 110 CAA differs
fundamentally from private commercial arbitration. Most significantly,
CAA is mandatory and non-binding, and deals with filed lawsuits referred to arbitration by the court-not potential lawsuits where the parties opt for arbitration.
There are a plethora of CAA variants currently in place at various
state and federal courts."'1 All provide for the involuntary assignment of
eligible cases to a hearing by experienced local attorneys who serve as
arbitrators."12 The arbitration hearing is conducted as an informal trial,
usually within a few months of the time that the issue is joined.
Procedural rules are relaxed, though the Federal Rules of Evidence are
generally used as "guides" to admissibility. The power of subpoena is
available." 3 A panel of three arbitrators' hears the testimony of the
are 46% and 9%, respectively. See M.-D. Jacoubovitch & C. Moore, Summary Jury
Trials in the Northern District of Ohio 11 (Federal Judicial Center 1982).
108. Other savings are significant. The money not spent on reporters, court personnel
and jurors' fees rapidly accumulates. See Lambros, supra note 51, at 800-01.
109. See Posner, supra note 87, at 377-79.
110. See generally E.A. Lind & J. Shapard, Evaluation of Court-Annexed Arbitrationin
Three FederalDistrictCourts (Federal Judicial Center 1981) (summarizing the effects of
this process in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the District of Connecticut and the
Northern District of California); Court-AnnexedArbitration and Experimentation: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Courts Civil Liberties,and the Administration of Justice
of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1986) (testimony of
various judges regarding experience with court-annexed arbitration) [hereinafter CAA
Hearings].
111. As of 1985, sixteen states had authorized CAA programs in place. See P. Ebener
& D. Betancourt, Court-Annexed Arbitration: The National Picture (Institute for Civil
Justice 1985). Congress has authorized mandatory CAA in ten district courts. See 28
U.S.C. § 658(1) (1988). Most courts use CAA only where the claimant seeks money
damages. See P. Ebener & D. Betancourt, supra, at 7.
112. All programs cap monetary damages. Federal district courts, for example, may
not refer cases where the relief sought exceeds S100,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 652(a)(l)(B)
(1988). Particular types of cases are occasionally exempted. See infra notes 201-202 and
accompanying text.
113. See, eg., E.D.N.Y. Local Arbitration R. § 5(d) (allowing for use of subpoenas for
attendance of witnesses and production of documents under Fed. R. Civ. P. 45); D.
Conn. R. 28 (giving special masters power to force compliance with their orders).
114. Some programs use only one arbitrator per case. See, eg., Barkai & Kassebaum,

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59

parties and their witnesses and makes an "award" immediately after the
trial."1 A party dissatisfied with the award may reject it by demanding a
formal trial de novo within a certain period, usually thirty days. If such
a demand is not filed, the arbitration award will be entered as the judgment of the court after expiration of the thirty days. The judgment then
has the same force and effect as any civil judgment, except that it is not
appealable. At any trial de novo, "the court shall not admit evidence
that there had been an arbitration proceeding, the nature or amount of
any other matter concerning the conduct of the arbitration
the award, or1 16
proceeding."
One of the crucial decisions in developing a CAA program is whether
to include disincentives for demanding a formal trial. Most programs
include such provisions. Normally, the party challenging the award
must deposit with the clerk an amount equivalent to the cost of the arbitration. 1 7 If he or she does not obtain a more favorable result, or if the
court finds that the trial de novo was sought in bad faith, the deposit is
forfeited. 8 Some courts require that the party demanding a full trial
must improve his or her position by at least a fixed percentage, while
others make more significant sanctions a possibility. 9 If the party demanding trial de novo falls short, the opposing party's attorney's fees and
costs may be shifted to the other side as a penalty.' 20 The specter of such
substantial monetary sanctions would no doubt deter demands for trial
de novo more effectively than the relatively modest costs of arbitration.
But, for just that reason, the stiffer sanctions are much2more problematic
from both the policy and constitutional perspectives.' '
Another key choice in designing a court-annexed arbitration program
concerns the "gate-keeping" function. Do we take the relief sought in
the complaint at face value? Or do we invest court resources to deterUsing Court-Annexed Arbitration to Reduce Litigant Costs and to Increase the Pace of
Litigation, 16 Pepperdine L. Rev. S43, S53-54 (1989) (discussing Hawaiian program). In
the Western District of Oklahoma, "[m]ost hearings are to be conducted by a single arbitrator, but the parties may agree to and request ... a panel of three." B. Meierhoefer,
supra note 106, at 3. In the Eastern District of New York, the process is reversed: the
parties may, but need not, agree to arbitrate before a single arbitrator. If they do not
agree, the arbitration is held before a panel of three. See E.D.N.Y. Local Arbitration R.
§ 4(c).
115. The award is an unadorned judgment on the merits, such as "we find for the
."
plaintiff in the amount of $_
116. E.D.N.Y. Local Arbitration R. § 7(c). Some courts permit trial witnesses to be
impeached by testimony at the arbitration hearing. See D. Conn. R. 28, § 10.
117. See E.D.N.Y. Local Arbitration R. § 7(d). A common figure is $225 if conducted
before a single arbitrator. See id. § 2.
118. See id. § 7(d). The final judgment, exclusive of costs and interest, must exceed the
arbitration award if plaintiff demands de novo trial.
119. For example, the Western District of Oklahoma requires at least 10% improvement. See W.D. Okla. R. 43(P)(5).
120. See id.; P. Ebener & D. Betancourt, supra note 111, at 10. Under the Hawaii state
program, if the arbitration award is not bettered by 15%, legal fees and costs up to $5,000
may be shifted. See Barkai & Kassebaum, supra note 114, at S54.
121. See infra text accompanying note 177.
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mine the legitimacy of that valuation? Some courts require the judge to
whom a case is assigned to assess its availability for court-annexed arbitration; frequently this is done by entertaining motions that no genuine
claim exceeding the maximum for arbitration exists.' 22 Other courts
have enacted a presumption that relief sought is within the monetary
maximum, which can be overcome by certification that a valid claim exceeding the maximum exists; the clerk of the court has authority to
schedule cases for arbitration at the time of filing.' 23 Courts that have
chosen this latter approach have realized significant savings in time and
expense.' 24
Because of the ability to step out of the queue for sparse judges and
courtrooms, litigants whose cases are referred to court-annexed arbitration obtain a hearing far faster than the time in which they would have
received a trial. In Pittsburgh's program, for example, the median time
to a CAA hearing is three months, while the wait for a trial is eighteen
months. 25 When properly designed, court-annexed
arbitration does of' 26
fer a "decidedly speedier alternative to trial."'
As might be expected, the evidence indicates that court-annexed arbitration also disposes of cases faster than trial. In California, the time for
completion of arbitrated cases is about half that required for cases on the
regular trial track.127 Thus, court-annexed arbitration can clearly meet
one of its goals-providing an alternative forum for the speedier resolution of disputes. The impact on the system is less clear, however, because
122. See, e.g., W.D. Okla. R. 43(B)(2)(e) (judge may decide, on motion by any party or
sua sponte, that the action is subject to mandatory arbitration because claim does not
exceed maximum).
123. See, e.g., E.D.N.Y. Local Arbitration R. §§ 3(A) (clerk has authority to schedule
cases); 3(C) (presumption that relief is within the monetary maximum can be overcome
by certification).
124. Empirical data from the RAND Institute for Civil Justice contrasted the programs in California and Pittsburgh. Among other significant administrative differences,
California judges assessed eligibility while the Pittsburgh courts adopted a presumption
of eligibility. California's program did little to increase the pace of disposition. Time to
disposition varied from nine months to over three years. In Pittsburgh, the average time
was three months. The cost of court-annexed arbitration in California was S123 for each
case assigned, and S299 for each case actually arbitrated. The comparable figures for
Pittsburgh were $76 and $175, respectively. See Hensler, What We Know and Don't
Know About Court-Administered Arbitration, 69 Judicature 270, 273-74 (1986).
125. See Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panaceaor Anathema?, 99 Harv. L.
Rev. 668, 674 (1986); Institute for Civil Justice, An Overview of the First Five Program
Years 36 (1983).
126. D. Bryant, Judicial Arbitration in California: An Update ix (Institute for Civil
Justice 1989). Judge Raymond Broderick reports that in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania the median time to arbitration was five months compared to an 11 -month wait
for trial. See Broderick, Court-Annexed Compulsory Arbitration, in Alternative Dispute
Resolution: A Handbook for Judges 50, 52 (P. Harter ed. 1987).
127. See D. Bryant, supra note 126, at 22 (table 6). It also appears that the de novo
trials are expedited because the groundwork in the court-annexed arbitration hearing
prepares the lawyers. See Broderick, supra note 126, at 52. Again, administrative design
is critical; not all arbitration programs succeed in resolving cases more rapidly than traditional settlement and trial procedure. See Edwards, supra note 125, at 674.
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most of the cases referred to arbitration would presumably have settled
short of trial."2 8 Whether CAA slows or speeds settlement is as yet unknown. There is reason to believe, however, that cases in court-annexed
arbitration settle earlier than those awaiting trial.
The arbitration hearing serves a role similar to that of the summary
jury trial, a "doomsday" event whose approach forces counsel to give
serious attention to the case. 129 In this way, scheduling arbitration is
similar to the scheduling of a trial date, causing the lawyers to face the
30
realities of their case and, frequently, to begin discussing settlement.
The difference, of course, is that arbitration occurs much earlier in the
life of a case than trial, and therefore the effect of court-annexed arbitration may be to accelerate the settlement process. 131
But court-annexed arbitration does more than force counsel to pay attention to the case. Litigants present all the evidence and argue the merits before a highly regarded panel of arbitrators. The hearing provides an
ideal opportunity to assess the strengths and pitfalls of the suit. If the
process is perceived as fair and the award regarded as a reasonable estimate of a likely trial verdict, many parties-even those dissatisfied on the
merits-will accept the outcome. In any event, the panel's fact-finding
and judgment create an external reality, similar to a verdict. Thus, the
award may greatly aid settlement negotiations by providing a foundation
for a mutually acceptable compromise.
Thus, it is expected that court-annexed arbitration would have three
primary effects on disputes: (1) some will settle before the arbitration
hearing, as opposed to months later on the eve of trial; (2) some will be
(3)
decided by the arbitrators in an award accepted by the parties; and 32
aid.'
an
as
serving
award
the
with
hearing,
the
after
settle
will
some
The numbers tell a story of success. Studies of court-annexed arbitration in federal courts concluded that upwards of ninety percent of disputes eligible for the program terminated without returning to the trial
calendar-and ninety percent of cases in which trial de novo was demanded settled before trial.133 Comparisons with cases not placed on the
128. See supra note 105.
129. See supra text accompanying note 101; see also E. Lind & J. Shapard, supra note
110, at 9 ("[M]any settlements occur when, and only when, the attorneys in the case find
it necessary to ... prepare the evidence, and assess the case's strengths, weaknesses, and
net monetary value.").
130. See CAA Hearings, supra note 110, at 18 (testimony of Chief Judge Robert
Peckham, relating experiences in the Northern District of California).
131. See Edwards, supra note 125, at 675.
132. See 1990 Report, supra note 33, at 83-84.
133. In the Northern District of California, 94% of eligible cases (not just those actually referred and arbitrated) terminated without returning to the trial calendar; 99% terminated short of trial. See B. Meierhoefer & C. Seron, Court-Annexed Arbitration in the
Northern District of California 12 (Federal Judicial Center 1988). The analogous figures
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania are 90% and 97%. See B. Meierhoefer, CourtAnnexed Arbitration in the Eastern Districtof Pennsylvania 14 (Federal Judicial Center
1988). For the Western District of Oklahoma, the statistics are 91% and 98%. See B.
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court-annexed arbitration track are instructive. Over a 129-month period in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, only two percent of cases
placed in the program required trial de novo. During the same period,
eight percent of the civil cases not placed in the arbitration program went

to trial.' 34 Studies of other programs indicate
that referring cases to arbi35

tration cut the incidence of trial in half.
Numerous studies of court-annexed arbitration programs have found
that those involved-litigants, lawyers, arbitrators and judges-overwhelmingly favor such arbitration. 136 Virtually every federal judge who
has experience with the program advocates the expansion of CAA in
scope and to other courts; almost all believed CAA helped them manage
their civil dockets. 1 37 Participating lawyers overwhelmingly expressed
satisfaction with the program 38 and, perhaps most
important, the parties
39
themselves regard CAA as fair and satisfying.
Court-annexed arbitration, then, appears to be meeting its goals of reMeierhoefer, supra note 106, at 16. State programs report similar successes. See, e.g.,
Note, Oregon Court-Annexed Arbitration: Just Whtat the Doctor Ordered?,21 Willamette
L. Rev. 593, 606 (1985) (Philadelphia CAA program disposes of 99% of cases short of
trial).
The key finding is the number of cases concluded short of trial. While some programs
have high rates of demand for trial de novo, this "appears to be fueled by the desire of
attorneys to keep their options open rather than by dissatisfaction with arbitration outcomes." D. Bryant, supra note 126, at x. Many may wish to strengthen a position prior
to settlement talks in which the arbitration award may well be crucial.
134. See Broderick, Court-Annexed Compulsory Arbitration: It Works, 72 Judicature
217, 222 (1989). That ratio has held constant over time. See Broderick, supra note 126,
at 52; CAA Hearings,supra note 110, at 3.
135. See Levin, Court-Annexed Arbitration, 16 U. Mich. J.L. Ref. 537, 542 (1983).
136. See supra note 134; ABA Litigation Section, Committee on Arbitration, Report on
Court-Annexed Arbitration 3 (1984); P. Ebener & D. Betancourt, supra note 112; E. Lind,
R. MacCoun, P. Ebener, W. Felstiner, D. Hensler, J. Resnik, T. Tyler, The Perceptionof
Justice: Tort Litigants' Views of Trial, Court-Annexed Arbitration, and Judicial Settlement Conferences 79 (Institute for Civil Justice 1989) [hereinafter Perception of Justice].
137. In fact, all surveyed judges in the Northern District of California, the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania and the Western District of Oklahoma had much enthusiasm for
CAA. See B. Meierhoefer & C. Seron, supra note 133, at 18 (Northern District of California); B. Meierhoefer, supra note 133, at 15 (Eastern District of Pennsylvania); B.
Meierhoefer, supra note 106, at 19 (Western District of Oklahoma).
138. For example, in the Northern District of California, over 80% of the attorneys
either approved or strongly approved of court-annexed arbitration. See B. Meierhoefer &
C. Seron, supra note 133, at 21. Over 60% felt their cases concluded more rapidly and
less expensively than they otherwise might have. See id. Over 80% of counsel felt that
the setting of an arbitration hearing date helped get settlement negotiations started. See
id. at 30. Of those attorneys whose cases terminated as a result of the hearing, 84% felt at
the outset that trial was somewhat or very likely. See id. at 30-31. Over 90% of participating attorneys felt that the procedures were fair and that there was adequate time for
presentation of the case, and over 80% felt that there was sufficient time for discovery.
See id. at 31. Even among those attorneys who demanded trial de novo, a majority felt
that CAA saved them time and their clients money. See id. at 32.
139. In the Northern District of California, 85% of the litigants felt that the process
was fair. All of those satisfied with the outcome thought so, as did half of those who were
dissatisfied. Over 70% of all litigants felt that CAA helped to bring the sides together.
See id. at 35-36. A study of state tort litigation concluded that "court-annexed arbitra-
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ducing litigant and court costs, increasing the pace of litigation and
maintaining the satisfaction of litigants. What has been said about CAA
in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania appears true overall: "the program has seen an increase in pre-hearing settlements, a reduction in the
incidence of trials, and an expedited hearing process for eligible casesall of which have saved time and expense for the litigants."' 40
While court-annexed arbitration is generally regarded as the most effective of the ADR mechanisms discussed here, 41 these glowing reviews
give an idea of the promise held out by court-annexed ADR. However,
every silver lining does have a cloud. In this case, the very idea of courts
initiating and mandating recourse to alternative mechanisms for resolving disputes is surrounded by controversy.
B. ADR in the Courthouse: Problems and Complaints
Criticism of court-initiated ADR focusses on three principal issues.
First, some argue that such programs do not "work"-that they neither
cut costs nor reduce congestion. Second, fundamental questions about
the constitutionality of some of the procedures have been raised. Third,
and more basically, the results produced by such programs have been
criticized as lacking fairness and, in essence, creating a diminished quality of justice.
1. Do They Work?
In a complex area like the civil justice system, obtaining meaningful
empirical data is difficult and basing policy conclusions on the available
data remains risky.' 4 2 Still, to get a rough measure of court-annexed
ADR's effectiveness, we should look to its impact on the cost and pace of
litigation, as well as to its acceptance by litigants. The firmest statistical
information available indicates that participants favor ADR. 4 3 They betion appears to give both plaintiffs and defendants what they want from the judicial process." Perception of Justice, supra note 136, at 79.
140. Nejelski & Zeldin, Court-Annexed Arbitration in the Federal Courts: The Philadelphia Story, 42 Md. L. Rev. 787, 818 (1983). Nationwide, empirical data indicates that
CAA "can contribute significantly to reducing court congestion, costs and delay and to
diminishing the financial and emotional costs of litigation for parties." Hensler, supra
note 124, at 273. Of course, the courts save money also, because arbitration is much less
expensive than trial. See D. Bryant, supra note 126, at 27.
141. See, e.g., Nejelski & Zeldin, supra note 140, at 819 ("Court-annexed arbitration is
the most effective of the current court-reform proposals.").
142. "Particularly in topical areas where data are fragmentary and the available analytic tools are crude, there is considerable potential for both inconsistent results and disagreements over interpretation." Hensler, Researching Civil Justice: Problems and
Pitfalls, 51 Law & Contemp. Probs. 55, 55-56 (1988). There is "essentially no sophisticated data concerning the relative time and cost of alternative dispute settlement mechanisms such as arbitration and mediation." Sander, Alternative Methods of Dispute
Resolution: An Overview, 37 U. Fla. L. Rev. 1, 15 (1985).
143. See supra text accompanying notes 70-75 (CAMP), 84-86 (ENE), 101-108 (SJT),
and 133-141 (CAA). Again, it is more likely that these processes would speed settle-
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lieve that these procedures saved them time and money.
A wide variety of studies have concluded that litigants, attorneys and judges like the
ADR process, and that litigants favor ADR even when it does not resolve the case according to their expectations. 4 5 Perhaps more revealing, parties seem to prefer the use of techniques like court-annexed
arbitration over more traditional settlement conferences, regarding the
former approach as fairer and more dignified.'"
Still, some commentators believe that these programs may lead to unanticipated consequences, undermining the contribution they make to
speedy disposition. For example, one argument favoring these programs
is that they give a neutral evaluation after a presentation of each side's
case. It has been argued, however, that in some cases this might reduce
the chance of settlement.' 4 7 Some parties are impelled to settle due to
fear of the unknown; they do not know the strength of their opponent's
case, and cannot hazard a guess about how the fact finder will decide. 4 '
To the extent that a process like summary jury trial supplies this infor49
mation, it could arguably diminish the odds of compromising a case.1
A more basic point is that the likelihood of delay plays an important
role in the dynamics of settlement and rate of civil filings. Some plaintiffs
with potentially meritorious grievances are deterred from filing suit by
the knowledge that it could be years before they secure any relief. '1
Similarly, delay increases the likelihood of settlement, as parties despair
of obtaining a speedy judicial determination.' 5' Thus, it is argued that as
52
delay is reduced, more actions will be filed and fewer will be settled.'
ment-if only because of the "doomsday" effect. See supra note 102 and accompanying
text.
144. See supra notes 72 (CAMP), 84-86 (ENE), 108 (SIT), and 124 (CAA) and accompanying text. The enthusiasm of "repeat players" like counsel and judges is most encouraging. If a procedure is a waste of time, we would expect experienced judges to abandon
it.
145. See Tyler, The Quality of Dispute Resolution Proceduresand Outcome" Measurement Problems and Possibilities,66 Den. U.L. Rev. 419, 429 (1989); supra note 139.
146. For example, one study concluded that "[s]ettlement conferences tended to provoke less favorable reactions than did trial and arbitration hearings. Perceptions of fairness were markedly lower for litigants whose cases were subject to settlement conferences
" Perception
..
of Justice, supra note 136, at 79.
147. See Maatman, supra note 64, at 484.
148. Cf Watson, The Settlement Theory of Discovery, 55 III. B.J. 480. 489-90 (1967)
(fear of unknown evidence in opponent's possession may be most important catalyst to
settlement).
149. See Maatman, supra note 64, at 484. For the moment we will put aside the fairness of settlements based on ignorance.
150. In economic terms, "litigation delay, by reducing the present value of the potential judgment in a dispute, reduces the likelihood of litigation." Priest, supra note 4, at
534.
151. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedureand JudicialAdministration, 2
J. Legal Stud. 399, 420-21 (1972).
152. Professor Priest terms his exposition of this possibility the "congestion equilibrium" hypothesis. Priest, supra note 4, at 535. "The equilibrium concept implies that the
parties' litigation decisions will serve to offset the effects of congestion reform. Indeed,
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For this reason, Judge Richard Posner has argued that even if the use
of alternatives like summary jury trials creates an atmosphere conducive
to settlement, the procedures are unlikely to affect the rate of settlement.1 53 For each case terminated through ADR, another case will advance in the queue. Some of the cases that would have settled because of
delay will now proceed to trial because the calendar is moving faster.
"Whatever happens, there will be the same number of trials." '54
Whether this would be true if court-annexed ADR were implemented
on a large scale is unclear. Even if that proves to be so, the conclusion
that all efforts to reduce delay and congestion are useless does not follow.
Indeed, court-annexed ADR may quicken the disposition of litigation
even if it does not substantially affect the backlog of cases, not an unattractive objective. 1 55 Under this view, the key measure of a given reform's effectiveness would be the output of the court system-even if the
influx of new cases returns the average delay to its equilibrium level, the
volume of disposition will have increased. In any event, large numbers of
litigants will have had their disputes fairly, quickly and inexpensively
determined.
To date, experience with ADR demonstrates that participant satisfaction is high and that delay and cost have been decreased, or at least have
not increased. 156 The numerous studies of ADR in the courts have all
been positive. 57 Perhaps the strongest reply to the argument that these
techniques have not been scientifically validated is the enthusiastic support voiced by participants familiar with one or another of the
processes.1 58 In the words of Judge Bertelsman, "[i]f the procedure is
ineffective and wastes time, we may expect it to be abandoned, since most
federal trial judges are not profligate of their time."'' 59 In sum, those
most familiar with ADR's effect on civil dockets-the judges-clearly
believe that when properly structured, these procedures work well.
2.

Are They Constitutional?

If reference to court-related ADR was merely an optional service provided to litigants, it would raise no significant constitutional issues. Most
the more effective a particular reform, the greater the offsetting response, as parties
choose to litigate rather than settle their disputes." Id. at 557.
153. See Posner, supra note 87, at 388.
154. Id. at 389. Posner believes that most of the cases disposed of through the use of
techniques like SJT would have settled without ADR. See id. at 388. This apparently
ignores the fact that cases are selected for SJT because they look like poor candidates for
settlement. See McKay v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 120 F.R.D. 43, 49 (E.D. Ky. 1988).
155. See Priest, supra note 4, at 538.
156. See 1990 Report, supra note 33, at 83.
157. "Studies of different ADR systems report satisfaction by participants and, in
some cases, favorable effects on litigation cost and delay." Id. Studies have shown that
some CAA programs resolve cases more rapidly than traditional settlement procedures.
See Perception of Justice, supra note 136, at 12.
158. See supra notes 138-139.
159. McKay v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 120 F.R.D. 43, 49 (E.D. Ky. 1988).
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programs are mandatory, however, and include sanctions of varying degrees if the parties proceed to full-blown trials. While these provisions
are necessary if the programs are to succeed,' 6° they do invite constitutional attack.
a. Access to the courts
There have been arguments for a broad-based constitutional right of
access to the courts. Professor Lawrence Tribe believes there is a fundamental right of access, grounded in the constitutional guarantees of equal
protection and due process. 16' Thus, any program restricting access to
the courts-by requiring the use of ADR mechanisms as a prerequisitewould trigger a heightened level of scrutiny. 162 If access to the courts is
defined as a fundamental right, the more stringent analysis would supplant the looser requirement of a "rational relationship" between these
programs and their objectives, 163 raising the question whether court-annexed ADR could pass constitutional muster.
To date, however, the Supreme Court has recognized a much more
limited right of access. Access to the courts has been afforded special
protection only when the right asserted in the underlying action is itself
fundamental and when there is no alternative forum in which to enforce
that right. For example, in Boddie v. Connecticut "6the Court held that
Connecticut could not make the judicial system the only forum for obtaining a divorce-dissolving the fundamental relationship of marriageand then inhibit court access by imposing mandatory filing fees. The
effect of that combination was to exclude indigent plaintiffs "from the
only forum effectively empowered to settle their disputes."' 6 When the
underlying right asserted is not fundamental, a program that inhibits access to the courts will be upheld so long as there is a rational basis for
160. In our adversarial system, one side is frequently reluctant to agree to anything the
other side proposes-despite the potential benefits to all concerned. See American Bar
Association Action Commission to Reduce Court Costs and Delay, Attacking Litigation
Costs and Delay 16 (1984) (when alternate procedure designed to speed case development
is voluntary, the procedure is infrequently used). Official encouragement to participate
can be important in overcoming hostility to the unfamiliar. In one case, an "attorney
who objected to the first summary jury trial he was required to participate in is now the
biggest local fan of the procedure." McKay, 120 F.R.D. at 49.
161. See L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 1462-63 (2d ed. 1988).
162. A right is "fundamental" in this sense if it is among those rights "explicitly or
implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution." San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1973). Under strict scrutiny, of course, the usual presumption of a
government program's validity falls away. The government carries a "heavy burden of
justification" to show that the challenged program is narrowly tailored and structured
with "precision." It at 16-17 (quoting Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972)).
163. Where no fundamental right (or suspect class) is involved, a court need only "determine whether [the program] rationally furthers some legitimate, articulated state purpose." Id at 17.
164. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
165. Id at 376.
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To many, the "rational basis" for court-related ADR is clear. In
addition, the incidental hurdle to court access that these programs impose is hardly a "denial" of access: all retain the right to full-blown trials. Any added delay or costs imposed are minimal.
b. Right to Jury Trial
The primary constitutional argument against a provision mandating
ADR for federal litigants is that it unconstitutionally burdens the right
to trial by jury. 67 The seventh amendment, however, protects "not 'trial
by jury,' but 'the right of trial by jury.' ",168 The amendment was
"designed to preserve the basic institution of jury trial in only its most
fundamental elements."' 1 69 At its heart, the seventh amendment strives
to preserve the right to have a "jury ultimately determine the issues of
fact if they cannot be settled by the parties or determined as a matter of
law. ' " 7 The amendment has never been understood to mandate that a
jury be impanelled at the earliest possible stage of a case.'
The Supreme Court has long upheld procedures requiring litigants to
appear before alternate fact finders prior to a jury trial. The seventh
amendment does not place restrictions on what "conditions may be imposed upon the demand of such a trial, consistently with preserving the
right to it.' 172 The Court has sustained a statute authorizing trial of
smaller disputes before non-article III justices of the peace, subject to
trial de novo upon demand; 73 upheld compulsory referral of a case to an
"auditor" who would make preliminary findings of fact;' 74 and endorsed
the inherent power75of federal courts to appoint special masters over the
parties' objection.
The Supreme Court has afforded Congress "considerable discretion"
166. See, e.g., Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 659-60 (1973) (per curiam) (since less
constitutional significance attaches to appellant's interest in welfare benefits than to divorce, state could set filing fee for appeal from adverse welfare decision); United States v.
Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 449-50 (1973) (upholding mandatory filing fee prior to discharge in
voluntary bankruptcy). Both Ortwein and Kras establish that reasonable fees may be set
as a prerequisite to bringing an action, so long as a fundamental right is not asserted.
167. See 1990 Report, supra note 33, at 84.
168. Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 23 (1899). The seventh amendment
reads, in part: "In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved ... " U.S. Const. amend. VII.
169. Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 392 (1943).
170. Woods v. Holy Cross Hosp., 591 F.2d 1164, 1178 (5th Cir. 1979) (emphasis in
original).
171. The amendment "does not prescribe at what stage of an action a trial by jury
must, if demanded, be had." Capital Traction, 174 U.S. at 23.

172. Id.
173. See Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1 (1899).
174. See Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 310 (1920).
175. See id. at 314; see also Brazil, Authority to Refer Discovery Tasks to Special Masters: Limitations on Existing Sources and the Need for a New Federal Rule, in W.D.
Brazil, G. Hazard, Jr. & P. Rice, Managing Complex Litigation 305 (1983) (discussing
Peterson and its progeny).
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to entrust cases to alternate forums in thefirst instance, whenever a "general increase in litigation" makes such reference necessary "to prevent
unnecessary delay and unreasonable expense."' 7' 6 Court-annexed ADR
has precisely these objectives. The programs discussed here do not block
ultimate access to jury trial.
The issue ultimately turns on the degree of burden created by the intervention. If the delay imposed-or the financial risk faced by a litigant
who seeks a jury trial de novo-is large enough in practice, a particular
program might arguably pose an intolerable impediment to the right to
jury trial.17 7 To date, no federal program has failed such a test."18 As
the programs expand in size, however, delay may well increase."19 On
balance, then, the constitutional outlook for court-related ADR is
favorable. 180

3. Are They Fair?
In itself, crafting processes that constitutionally dispose of cases more
quickly and inexpensively is insufficient cause for rejoicing. We must not
become entangled in the "mystique of disposition uber alles."'I' The
highest value in the justice system, after all, is justice. The ultimate issue
on which the desirability of court-annexed ADR will turn is the fairness
of the results it produces.
To determine that issue, we must touch upon the fairness of settlements in general. The ADR mechanisms discussed here are intended to
foster settlement. 182 There is a sense among some commentators that
176. Capital Traction, 174 U.S. at 44-45.
177. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court struck down compulsory arbitration, finding
that in practice it imposed unconscionable delays and rendered the state jury right practically unavailable. See Mattos v. Thompson, 491 Pa. 385, 396, 421 A.2d 190, 195 (1980).
Pennsylvania was an extraordinary example: delays of roughly four years were attributable to the program. See id.
178. See, e.g., Rhea v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 767 F.2d 266, 268 (6th Cir. 1985)
("Federal courts have repeatedly upheld mandatory arbitration procedures in the face of
challenges based on the right to a jury trial."); Woods v. Holy Cross Hosp., 591 F.2d
1164, 1179 (5th Cir. 1979) (medical liability mediation panel did not violate seventh
amendment); New England Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Hughes, 556 F. Supp. 712, 714
(E.D. Pa- 1983) (compulsory arbitration program did not violate seventh amendment);
Kimbrough v. Holiday Inn, 478 F. Supp. 566, 569 (E.D. Pa. 1979) ("a procedure for
nonjudicial determination prior to a jury trial does not constitute a Seventh Amendment
violation").
179. See, eg., Coulson, The Coming Evolution in Court-AdministeredArbitration, 69
Judicature 276-77 (1986) (predicting increasing difficulty in obtaining sufficient
arbitrators).
180. See generally Golann, Making Alternative Dispute Resolution Mandatory: The
ConstitutionalIssues, 68 Or. L. Rev. 487, 505 (1989) (lower courts have uniformly upheld
nonbinding ADR).
181. Miller, The Adversary System: Dinosaur or Phoenix, 69 Minn. L. Rev. 1, 35
(1984).
182. They are consistent with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(c)(7), which provides that district courts may "take action with respect to... the possibility of settlement
or the use of extrajudicial procedures to resolve the dispute." When the award in a pro-
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settlement leads to better justice than the "all or nothing, black or white
end result of a trial," and that "a freely negotiated settlement is a higher
quality of justice which is obtainable earlier and at less cost."'"" Partially
due to this attitude, but probably more because of the system's overcrowding, the settlement process has become the core of the judicial process. After decades of resistance, and in the face of some persistent
opposition, the federal judiciary has unmistakably embraced an active
role in promoting settlement. 1 84 Yet fundamental criticism about settlement exists, criticism that calls into question its fairness to the parties,
other litigants and society as a whole; many firmly believe that the court
has no business encouraging settlements and should refrain from doing
SO. 185

Because settlement consists of a solution arrived at by negotiation

rather than by a court's application of legal rules, some argue that it
allows the stronger party to pressure the weaker into an unjust agreement. Distributional inequalities-the fact that some parties have ample
resources available to finance lengthy litigation and others do not-mean
the weaker party is frequently coerced into acquiescence. ' 6 Any outcome that results from one party's brute bargaining power is neither acceptable nor just. To the extent that excess delay produces8settlements,
it
7
does so unfairly. Yet this happens with some regularity.1
The parameters of any settlement, like all private transactions, hinge
on the relative strength of the parties. The legal system cannot eliminate
the reality that some adversaries are more powerful than others. Until
we can deliver judgments on demand, the stronger will attempt to lord it
over the weaker.
Still, the system strives to extend its even hand beyond the courtroom
to the pretrial phase. While disparities in power are important, negotiations do not occur in a Hobbesian state of nature,'
nor do they take
place in a vacuum. The substantive law governing the dispute establishes
the boundaries of agreement. The judgment that a court would impose
gram like court-annexed arbitration is accepted, of course, ADR has moved beyond facilitating negotiations.
183. Flanders, Case Management in Federal Courts: Some Controversiesand Some Resuits, 4 Just. Sys. J. 147, 150 (1978).
184. See generally Galanter, The Emergence of the Judge as a Mediator in Civil Cases,
69 Judicature 257, 261 (1986) (settlement is not merely convenient, but produces superior
results). The ascendancy of the judge's role in settlement was formally recognized in the
1983 amendments to Fed. R. Civ. P. 16. See supra note 174. For the most prominent
critique of this interventionist role, see Resnik, ManagerialJudges, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 374
(1982). For criticism of her critique, see Flanders, supra note 105.
185. See generally Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 Yale L.J. 1073, 1075 (1984)
("[S]ettlement is a capitulation to the conditions of mass society and should be neither
encouraged nor praised.").
186. See id. at 1076. A minimal "take-it-or-leave-it" offer might well tempt the weaker
party in such a situation.
187. Alschuler, supra note 13, at 1820.
188. See T. Hobbes, The Leviathan (1914).
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after trial-or, more accurately, the parties' expectation of that outcome-defines the bargaining power of each side. The negotiating process thus unfolds in the shadow of the law.' 89 This does not guarantee
fair settlements-parties will still differ in their abilities to bear cost and
delay, negotiating skill and willingness to take risks'"-but it increases
the likelihood of just results.
Another restraint on the unfairness of settlements has come with increasing judicial involvement in pretrial proceedings. Cases that formerly would have been settled without judicial involvement now require
some judicial input: "We have moved from dyadic to mediated bargaining."1 91 Bringing ADR into the courthouse has continued this move.
The buffer between the parties protects the weaker while giving both
sides information needed to bargain intelligently. Whether an ADR-assisted settlement would resemble a trial verdict or unassisted settlement
is uncertain. 92 It would seem, though, that the involvement of a panel
of neutral arbitrators or of a jury culled from the regular jury pool would
more closely approximate justice than naked
bargaining. With ADR, the
93
shadow of the law looms much larger.
There is no body of statistics from which we can measure the fairness
of court-related ADR. Again, the best indicator is the satisfaction of the
participants. 94 As we have seen, litigants like ADR and think it produces fair outcomes." 9 The only direct comparison to "regular" settlements indicates that litigants prefer settlements achieved through court189. See Mnookin & Kornhauser, Bargainingin the Shadow of the Law: The Case of
Divorce, 88 Yale L.J. 950, 968 (1979).
190. See Galanter, supra note 41, at 33-34.
191. Galanter, supra note 184, at 262; see Resnik, supra note 184, at 378-79.
192. "Because settlement data are private, it is difficult to measure the effect of ADR
on case outcomes. But several studies that have looked at this question have found no
evidence of significant change." Hensler, Court-Annexed ADR. in Donovan Leisure
Newton & Irvine ADR Practice Book 351, 371 (J. Wilkinson ed. 1990); see also J.Adler,
D. Hensler, C. Nelson, & G. Rest, Simple Justice: How Litigants Fare in the Pittsburgh
Court Arbitration Program 85, 90-92 (Institute for Civil Justice 1983) (most litigants interviewed believed that arbitration was an acceptable manner of resolving their disputes);
E. Lind, ArbitratingHigh Stakes Case" An Evaluation of Court-Annexed Arbitrationin a
United States DistrictCourt (Institute for Civil Justice 1990) (litigants felt that arbitration
process was fair overall). The congruence between arbitration awards and decisions of
trials de novo varies from program to program. For example, in Multnomah County,
Oregon, the congruence was 41%, while the comparable figure in Philadelphia was 68%.
See Note, supra note 133, at 608. Of course, these rough percentages are for the small
number of cases taken to trial de novo. These figures tell us nothing about those verdicts
that are accepted.
193. In addition, to the degree these programs reduce delay, they limit the impact of
inequality.
194. See Levin & Golash, Alternative Dispute Resolution in FederalDistrict Courts, 37
U. Fla. L. Rev. 29, 35 (1985). Luban has argued that "[p]articipant satisfaction is not
valued for its own sake, but for the sake of whatever it is the participants feel good about.
For most likely what the participants feel good about is the justice of the procedure."
Luban, The Quality of Justice, 66 Den. U.L. Rev. 381, 407 (1989) (emphasis in original).
195. See supra notes 137-138.
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annexed arbitration. 196
Traditional settlements, of course, are the proper benchmark against
which to assess ADR. It is not a question of court-annexed ADR versus
trials, but rather of court-annexed ADR versus relatively unmediated
bargaining. In that context, these dispute resolution mechanisms appear
quite fair.
More fundamental attacks have been launched against settlement. In
a sense, legal norms articulate the public morality of our society. Trials
serve to enforce these norms while, to a degree, settlements evade
them. 197 This discrepancy manifests itself in two ways. First, parties to
a private settlement can more easily pass losses and risks to third parties.
For example, a dispute over a public nuisance, such as pollutants flowing
onto plaintiff's property, can be "resolved" by an agreement to shift the
dumping onto a third party's property. Such a private settlement would
satisfy both disputants but is unlikely to resemble the result of public
litigation.' 9 8 Courts are an important vehicle for striking the necessary
balance between community and individual. A more private method of
dispute resolution such as ADR runs the risk of neglecting that
balance. 199
A wider danger in the evasion of conventional litigation may be the
undermining of public values that underlie legal principles. Increasing
resort to ADR could stunt the growth of legal precedent by enabling
litigants to bypass the public judicial arena. Because there can be no
evolving common law with private ADR, the results in similar cases may
well vary considerably.2 " ° The guidance that third parties gain from
published judicial opinions might be undercut and the law's progress retarded. The law cannot respond to changing times and new technologies
if the disputes that these developments engender never pass through the
courthouse doors. In sum, it is urged that ADR will hamper the evolution of public morality by removing disputes from the reach of judicial
rulemaking. This risk is exacerbated in the spectrum of cases that serve
remedial and social functions--cases involving civil rights, institutional
reform, or environmental pollution.
Some of these criticisms seem exaggerated. Even the most optimistic
predictions do not envision ADR diverting so many cases from trial that
the common law will dry up. Still, these concerns are valid and we
should heed them. Of greatest concern is the need to ensure that the
adjudication of important public rights and duties remains public. This
points to a unique strength of court-annexed ADR: so long as ADR
196. See Perception of Justice, supra note 136, at 79.
197. See Brunet, Questioning the Quality of Alternate Dispute Resolution, 62 Tul. L.
Rev. 1, 16 (1987); Fiss, supra note 185, at 1085; Luban, supra note 194 at 388.
198. See Luban, supra note 194, at 404-05.
199. See Terrell, Rights and Wrongs in the Rush to Repose: On the Jurisprudential
Dangers of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 36 Emory L.J. 541, 549 (1987).

200. See id. at 544-45.
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mechanisms are adjuncts to courts, steps can be taken to ensure that issues of great public concern are resolved in a public forum. Administering ADR in the courthouse allows for supervision by the judiciary,
minimizing any risks.
Further, Congress has established some guidelines. For example,
claims based on constitutional violations as well as all civil rights claims
have been exempted from compulsory arbitration in the ten districts in
which CAA has been authorized.2"' Also, each of these courts must establish rules for a system that exempts cases from arbitration for good
cause, including cases that involve complex or novel
legal issues or in
20 2
which legal issues predominate over factual ones.
Such standards would ensure that the law continues to grow and that
judicial pronouncements will not be foreclosed on important issues of
public policy. For better or worse, we have invested the courts with an
almost ecclesiastical authority to interpret constitutional and community
values. In a properly designed program, court-annexed ADR will not
undermine or diminish that role.
We must continually bear in mind that we are discussing the impact of
ADR on a judicial system in which a full-blown trial is an unusual event.
Court-annexed ADR programs do result in more "adjudicated" casesthose in which a neutral third party renders a judgment on the merits of
a case. It is difficult to believe that the results are less fair than those of a
system in which the only adjudicative method available, trial, will occur
in appreciably less than ten percent of cases. Indeed, to the extent that
delay and congestion are reduced and hardcore disputes brought to trial
sooner, court-annexed ADR enhances fairness for all--even those litigants for whom203 participation in arbitration or summary jury trial resolves nothing.

4.

Other Questions

Significant questions about some of these programs remain.
a.

What authority?

Congress has authorized mandatory arbitration in ten district
courts. 2" It would appear that no additional district court could establish such a program without expanded legislative authorization.
No specific statutory authorization for SJT currently exists, and at
least one court has concluded that federal judges lack authority to com201. See 28 U.S.C. § 652(b) (1988). Currently, mandatory CAA is authorized only in
ten district courts. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 651, 658 (1988).
202. See 28 U.S.C. § 652(c) (1988).
203. As my colleague Judge Jon 0. Newman has observed, "we must include in our
assessment of fairness... fairness in the broader context for all who use and wish to use
the litigation process." Newman, supra note 40, at 1647.
204. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 651(a), 658 (1988).
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pel participation in SJTs.2 °5 Defenders of the procedure, however, see
the bases for that authority in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16 and in
inherent judicial power.20 6
Rule 16 empowers a court to order attorneys and unrepresented parties to appear at pretrial conferences designed to facilitate settlement of
the case. 207 The participants are authorized to "consider and take action
with respect
to . . . the use of extrajudicial procedures to resolve the
20 8
dispute.
One commentator has argued that SJT is merely a pretrial meeting in
another form and that "the provisions of Rule 16 should not be read to
limit such pretrial meetings to those which are traditionally defined as
conferences. 20 9 In other words, SJT is merely a variant of pretrial conference. It is more plausible to consider summary trials the type of "extrajudicial procedures" the Rule allows to be considered at a pretrial
conference.2 10
But, as the Seventh Circuit has noted, while Rule 16 "was intended to
foster settlement through the use of extrajudicial procedures," it alone
cannot "be read as authorizing a mandatory summary jury trial."2 I The
Rule merely states that parties "may consider and take action with respect to" such extrajudicial procedures.2 12 Still, the Seventh Circuit's decision in Strandell v. Jackson County appears to go to the opposite
extreme: not only does Rule 16 fall short of explicit authorization, but
the Rule's parameters "do not permit" compulsory SJTs.2 13 This conclusion flowed from the court's equation of SJT with the imposition of settlement negotiations on an unwilling litigant or the equivalent of
coercing the parties into an involuntary compromise. 2 14 Aside from mischaracterizing the intent of summary jury trials (and all ADR), the opinion reflects a crabbed reading of a district court's authority.
205. See Strandell v. Jackson County, 838 F.2d 884, 888 (7th Cir. 1987).
206. See supra note 76. This discussion applies with equal force to early neutral evaluation programs.
207. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(a). The explicit authorization to compel the attendance of
pro se litigants should not be taken to preclude a court's authority to so order represented
litigants. See G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648, 656 (7th Cir.
1989) (en bane).
208. Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(c). They may also take action with respect to "such other
matters as may aid in the disposition of the action." Id.
209. Note, Compelling Alternatives: The Authority of Federal Judges to Order Summary Jury Trial Participation,57 Fordham L. Rev. 483, 493 (1988). See generally McKay, supra note 65 (Rule 16 allows judge wide discretion in authorizing pretrial
meetings).
210. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(7); Lambros, supra note 51, at 802.
211. Strandell v. Jackson County, 838 F.2d 884, 887 (7th Cir. 1987) (emphasis in
original).
212. Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(c) (emphasis added).
213. Strandell, 838 F.2d at 888.
214. See id. at 887. To similar effect, the Second Circuit has noted that Rule 16 "was
not designed as a means for clubbing the parties--or one of them-into an involuntary
compromise." Kothe v. Smith, 771 F.2d 667, 669 (2d Cir. 1985).
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As the Supreme Court has noted, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
are not the exclusive authority for procedural actions taken by the district courts. Instead, a court's actions may properly be grounded in" 'inherent power,' governed not by rule or statute but by the control
necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve
the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases." 2 5 Indeed, as the Rules
recognize and numerous courts have noted,216 "the mere absence of language in the federal rules specifically authorizing or describing a particular judicial procedure should not, and does not, give rise to a negative
'
implication of prohibition." 217
Of course, a district court cannot exercise its inherent power to manage its docket as it sees fit in a manner inconsistent with rule or statute.
SJTs, however, are fully in keeping with the aims of Rule 16 and Rule 1.
The Judicial Conference of the United States has apparently reached the
same conclusion, formally endorsing the experimental use of SJTs in
1984.218
A judge, however, does not have the power to impose settlement on
parties who insist on their day in court.2 19 The Rules draw a clear distinction between being required to attend a settlement conference and
being required to participate in settlement negotiations. 22 0 The Strandell
court apparently believed that a compulsory SJT was equivalent to the
imposition of compulsory settlement negotiations, and therefore an im22
proper abridgement of the right to trial. 1
That conclusion, however, rests on a misconception of this and other
215. Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962).
216. "In all cases not provided for by rule, the district judges and magistrates may
regulate their practice in any manner not inconsistent with these rules or those of the
district in which they act." Fed. R. Civ. P. 83; see also Link, 370 U.S. at 630 (Rule 41(b)
contains no "negative implication" prohibiting involuntary dismissal for non-prosecution
where defendant has not so moved).
217. G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648, 652 (7th Cir. 1989)
(en banc). In upholding a district court's authority to compel a party's attendance at a
settlement conference, the opinion gave an expansive reading of a district judge's inherent
power. As one SJT commentator has noted, the en banc decision in Heileman seriously
undercut the precedential value of Strandell v. Jackson County (though the earlier panel
decision is cited in Heileman, 871 F.2d at 653 n.8). See Houck, The Judicial Power to
Compel A Summary Jury Trial, in Donovan Leisure Newton & Irvine ADR Practice
Book 385, 391 (J. Wilkinson ed. 1990).
218. See Report of the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the U.S., Comm. on
the Operation of the Jury System 88 (1984). Language limiting this endorsement to consensual SJTs was purposely deleted from a previous draft. For the text of both versions,
see Strandell v. Jackson County, 115 F.R.D. 333, 334-35 (S.D. II!. 1987), vacated, 838
F.2d 884 (7th Cir. 1988).
219. See Kothe v. Smith, 771 F.2d 667, 669 (2d Cir. 1985).
220. "Although it is not the purpose of Rule 16(b)(7) to impose settlement negotiations
on unwilling litigants, it is believed that providing a neutral forum for discussing (settlement] might foster it." Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(c) advisory committee's note (1983
amendment).
221. See Strandell v. Jackson County, 838 F.2d 884, 887-88 (7th Cir. 1988) (en banc);
see also Houck, supra note 217, at 390 (discussing this aspect of Strandell); Federal Reserve Bank v. Carey-Canada, Inc., 123 F.R.D. 603, 606 (D.Minn. 1988) ("The Seventh
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forms of ADR. Like each court-annexed ADR mechanism discussed
here, a summary jury trial is not binding. While it aims to encourage
settlement negotiations (and to make them more fruitful by providing
both sides with valuable information), it in no way compels them.22 2 Nor
does an SJT in any way deny a party's right to trial.
Reflecting a more generous view of a court's inherent authority, district courts in three circuits have expressly rejected the Seventh Circuit's
Strandell analysis.22 3 Of course, an amendment to Rule 16 explicitly authorizing SJTs would dispel all doubts on the issue. Nonetheless, even
absent such an amendment or local rule, an individual judge possesses
the authority to compel summary jury trials. It would, however, seem
advisable for courts to adopt local rules clarifying the procedure for
utilizing SJTs.
b.

What about privileged information?

The Seventh Circuit's Strandelldecision also expressed the view that a
summary jury trial could not be imposed on recalcitrant parties when it
might require disclosure of information privileged from discovery.2 24
Some have questioned whether compelled disclosure is even an issue, arguing that the decision to withhold privileged information is merely a
matter of tactics and that counsel can structure their presentations as
desired. 225 That approach threatens to render SJTs a wasteful exercise in
those cases where privileged information could affect the outcome at
trial. Some lower courts have attacked the problem head on. Since modem federal courts require a comprehensive pretrial order-including the
marking of all exhibits, the exchange of witness lists and summaries of
expected testimony-"it is hard to see how anything would be disclosed
by a summary jury
trial that would not ...already be contained in the
226
pretrial order.
In the vast majority of cases, SJTs would serve their function even if
the parties could hold back privileged information. In almost all cases,
trial is based on facts uncovered through discovery. In those rare instances in which privileged information is crucial to a party's case and he
Circuit [in Strandell] reasoned that compelled participation would result in litigants' loss
of their right to proceed to trial, and forced courthouse settlements.").
222. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(c) advisory committee's note (1983 amendment).
223. See Carey-Canada, 123 F.R.D. at 606; McKay v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 120 F.R.D.
43, 48-49 (E.D. Ky. 1988); Arabian Am. Oil Co. v. Scarfone, 119 F.R.D. 448, 449 (M.D.
Fla. 1988).
224. See Strandell, 838 F.2d at 888. In Strandell, plaintiffs had obtained statements
from 21 witnesses. After the close of discovery, the court denied defendants' motion to
compel production of those statements because the defendants had failed to meet the
"substantial need" and "undue hardship" requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3). See id. at 885. Plaintiffs' counsel then refused to participate in the SJT,
arguing that it would require disclosure of the privileged statements. See id.
225. See Houck, supra note 217, at 390-91.
226. McKay, 120 F.R.D. at 48; see Federal Reserve Bank v. Carey-Canada, Inc., 123
F.R.D. 603, 606 (D. Minn. 1988).
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is determined not to reveal it until trial, SJT may not be useful and the
court should probably not compel it.22 7 "That is a very different thing,
however,
from saying that the court lacked the power to require an
, 2 28
SmT.
c.

Will the press have access?

A related question is whether the first amendment right of access will
attach to court-annexed ADR. When the media has asserted a right to
attend judicial proceedings, the Supreme Court has applied a twopronged analysis. First, the proceeding must be one for which there has
been a "tradition of accessibility. ' 229 Second, public access must play a
"significant positive role in the functioning of the particular process in
question.1 2 0 It is far too early to speak of "traditions" for programs
little more than a decade old. In any event, practice thus far weighs
heavily against allowing access to the public. 2 3 ' The ADR mechanisms
that federal courts have adopted to date are "procedure[s] that might
lead the parties to voluntarily terminate the litigation. 2 3 2 In that respect, they most resemble settlement conferences. Such conferences have
historically been closed to the public and the press.23 3
In addressing whether access would play a "significant positive role"
in the functioning of ADR,23 4 "it is necessary to consider whether the
'practice in question [furthers] an important or substantial governmental
interest unrelated to the suppression of expression' and whether 'the limitation of First Amendment freedoms [is] no greater than is necessary or
essential to the protection of the particular governmental interest
involved.' "235
The role that ADR can play in the heavily overburdened federal court
system certainly establishes a "substantial government interest." Public
access over one or more parties' objections would undoubtedly under227. See Houck, supra note 217, at 391.
228. Id.; see also Marcus, supra note 90, at 750 (privileged information arguments "not
persuasive").
229. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986) (quoting Globe
Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 605 (1982)).
230. Id. (quoting Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606). Even where present, the right of
access has been termed a qualified one. See id. at 9.
231. The effect of publicity on settlements is currently at issue in medical malpractice
suits. As of September 1990, federal law requires hospitals, medical boards and insurance
companies to submit reports on disciplinary actions and settlements. The American

Medical Association fears that such recording of adverse settlements in minor cases decreases the chances of privately settling burdensome "nuisance suits" and of any settlement under $30,000 being reported. See Hilts, Ideas and Trends; Orersight, Phase I:
Keeping Records of Doctors with Records, N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1990, at A26, col. I.

232. Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 854 F.2d 900, 905 (6th Cir.
1988), cert. denied sub nora. Cincinnati Post v. General Elec. Co., 109 S.Ct. 1171 (1989).
233. See Palmieri v. New York, 779 F.2d 861, 865 (2d Cir. 1985).
234. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986).
235. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 32 (1984) (quoting Procunier v.
Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974)).
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mine the utility of the procedure as a settlement device. Thus, as the
Sixth Circuit concluded in a case involving SJTs, "allowing access would
undermine the substantial governmental interest in promoting settlements, and would not play a 'significant positive role in the functioning
of the particular process in question.' "236
There is something unsettling about barring the press from such proceedings.2 3 7 That ill-defined unease, which I have experienced, probably
flows from the similarity of SJT and CAA to trial on the merits, a context in which press access has enjoyed substantial protection. But we
must be mindful that there is no binding judicial determination that decides the litigation at these alternative procedures. They are "inextricably bound up with the settlement process."2'38 The media cannot compel
disclosures about negotiations preceding a traditional settlement, even if
such negotiations are conducted with the participation of the court. It
would seem that the press lacks a right of access to these less traditional
proceedings.
CONCLUSION

Seven hundred seventy-five years ago, King John, in the Magna Carta,
promised "[T]o no one will we deny or delay right or justice. 2 39 That
promise has proven devilishly difficult to keep. It has yet to be completely fulfilled. Still, in light of all the pressures on the nation's courts,
we can be justly proud of their performances and innovations. Given the
startling growth of a federal judge's workload over the last forty years, I
am heartened that the system has not already buckled. That the courts
have survived testifies to a willingness to meet challenges through
change. Judges today take a much more active role in case management
than in years past, bolstered by increased power to sanction attorneys
who wield discovery and delay as weapons. 24 0 This ability to react has
enabled the federal system to shoulder its vastly increased load while
continuing to dispense quality justice. An even greater willingness to experiment is needed now. The sense of crisis gripping some in the legal
community2 4 1 is all to the good if it spurs us to meaningful experimentation and reform.
The procedures discussed in this article bring the encouraging news
236. Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 854 F.2d 900, 904 (6th Cir.
1988), cert. denied sub nom. Cincinnati Post v. General Elec., 109 S. Ct. 1171 (1989)
(quoting Press-Enterprise,478 U.S. at 8).
237. See Marcus, supra note 90, at 780-81.
238. Lambros, supra note 51, at 802.
239. Quoted in J.C. Holt, Magna Carta 327 (1965) (J.C. Holt trans.).
240. See generally Galanter, supra note 184, at 261-62 (surveying emergence of the
judge as mediator in civil cases); Peckham, supra note 51, at 254 (discussing the role of
the judge as case manager); Flanders, supra note 105, at 505, 516 (defending modern
judicial management of civil cases).
241. See, e.g., Coyle, supra note 24, at 1, col. 1 (noting "ominous signs that federal
courts soon won't be able to function as intended").
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that there are judicial innovators willing to take courageous steps. 212
These ADR programs began as isolated experiments. As with any experiment, questions arise just as some problems are solved. But given the
dire situation in which our courts find themselves and the encouraging
results that these procedural innovations achieved, I feel confident in
24 3
urging an expansion in court-annexed ADR.
I caution that ADR is not a magic potion. It is not a panacea for all
the problems facing the federal courts. The problems of caseloads, delays
and costs are simply too great. But all the evidence to date indicates that
ADR can make a valuable contribution to easing access to the courts.
To take advantage of that potential, Congress should act:
(1) to authorize mandatory arbitration in all federal district courts; 2 "
and
(2) to make explicit the authority of all federal courts to refer cases to
mandatory non-binding ADR, including early neutral evaluation,
court-annexed arbitration, and summary jury trials.24 5
This enabling legislation should be general enough to allow continued
local diversity. These reforms will take root only if district courts can
adapt them to particular local needs. In addition, participation by the
local bar in the drafting of court rules will give them greater acceptability. Exploring alternative procedures will furnish us with experience and
knowledge. Using the district courts as laboratories will help us learn
what works best.
Is it premature to expand? I believe that the current conditions do not
permit delay. The overloading of the system has become dangerous and
relief for courts and litigants is imperative. After forty years on the
bench, I am convinced that concerted and immediate action is necessary
to preserve the precious resource that the Founding Fathers created: Article III courts. Mounting delays compel the system to react if its roleto provide a forum for solving important controversies when all other
methods fail-is to be fulfilled.
For the federal courts to function efficiently, an essential reform that
must be pursued is perfecting our ability to remove from the calendar,
early in the litigation process, those cases that are destined to settle after
242. As former Chief Justice Burger has commented, judges willing to act as "judicial
pioneers should be commended for their innovative programs. We need more of them in
the future." D. Provine, Settlement Strategies for Federal District Judges 69 n. 171 (Federal Judicial Center 1986).
243. The Federal Courts Study Committee shares this confidence: "The movement to
infuse [ADR] techniques into the federal courts no longer need be limited to local experiments. But the variations in local conditions make equally inappropriate the imposition
of uniform national ADR rules .... " 1990 Report, supra note 33, at 83.
244. The Federal Judicial Center advocates authorizing CAA in all courts, which
could then determine in their discretion whether it would be mandatory or voluntary.
See B. Meierhoefer, Court-Annexed Arbitration in Ten Federal District Courts [Draft) 2
(Federal Judicial Center, forthcoming).
245. The Federal Courts Study Committee has made a similar proposal. 1990 Report,
supra note 33, at 83.
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clogging a court's docket for years. Many cases are frivolous, brought
out of a notion that litigation should be a first resort and not a last recourse. Indeed, some are brought to extort settlement. It is important to
weed out these cases, the sooner the better, through motion or settlement. They pollute the whole process of meting out justice and thus
deny access to other litigants. Even in meritorious cases, however, we
must consider whether parties, if given the assistance of the courts, might
not arrive at a mutually agreeable solution relatively quickly and inexpensively. It is wise to remember that litigation is an irritant. Judge
Learned Hand expressed his view: "I must say that, as a litigant, I should
dread a lawsuit beyond almost anything else short of sickness and of
death."24 6
Court-annexed ADR promises to make such early settlement more
likely, relieving pressure on an overburdened judiciary and mitigating delay for all concerned. By bringing ADR into the courthouse, we can
increase efficiency and still maintain fairness. Without the speedy, inexpensive disposition of cases, justice is denied. Over a decade ago, the
Pound Conference Report put the point well:
The ultimate goal is to make it possible for our system to provide justice for all. Constitutional guarantees of human rights ring hollow if
there is no forum available in fact for their vindication. Statutory
rights become empty promises if adjudication is too long delayed to
make them meaningful or the value of a claim is consumed by the
expense of asserting it. Only if our courts are functioning smoothly
can equal justice become a reality for all.24 7
246. Quoted in J. Frank, Courts on Trial 40 (1973).
247. Pound Conference, supra note 5, at 300.

